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ABSTRACT
A continuing justification of capital punishment is its alleged 
deterrent effect upon the general population. Both the threat and the 
actual use of the death penalty for capital offenders is assumed to have 
a general preventive effect. That is, it is assumed that persons con­
templating a criminal act punishable by death will forego the commission 
of the act because they fear the punishment of death threatened or 
previously imposed on others. Since the late 1960s, the debate over the 
deterrent effect of capital punishment has become a more pressing issue 
among social scientists because of the Supreme Court's evolving defi­
nitions concerning the constitutionality of the death penalty and the 
conditions of its use.
In 1967, the Supreme Court declared a moratorium on executions 
while the Justices evaluated the constitutionality of state laws on 
capital punishment. The Court has not declared the death penalty, per 
se, to be unconstitutional, but has struck down many state statutes, 
declaring that the death penalty has been used in an "arbitrary and 
capricious manner." The Court has altered, through several major 
decisions, the requirements of constitutionality that the state statutes 
must meet for the death penalty to be implemented. The Court, and the 
general public, often voice support for the penalty because of a belief 
in its deterrent power.
One area of statutory revision has been the definitions of what 
acts are capital crimes. Prior to 1967, some states included the murder 
of law enforcement officers in their definitions of capital homicide.
Law enforcement groups have lobbied to retain or include these protective 
provisions within the statutes because of the purported deterrent effect 
of these statutory penalties.
The major question for the present research is whether officers 
are actually safer in those states that have statutorily retained the 
death penalty. Also of interest is whether this safety is compounded in 
those states that have included a special provision in the definition of 
capital homicide regarding the killing of law enforcement officers. It 
is hypothesized that the evolving definitions of the constitutionality 
of death penalty statutes make execution a more plausible threat to 
potential murderers, even though there have been few executions during 
the period under study.
Several secondary questions are addressed also. First, what are 
the extralegal factors that contribute to the homicide rate of police 
officers? Second, does capital punishment exhibit a deterrent effect on 
lesser crimes? For example, most officers are killed by firearms. If 
a homicide can be accurately described as "typically no more than a 
violent assault that happens to have a fatal outcome" (Wilson, 1980:
14), and the penalty for killing a law enforcement officer is death, 
will fewer officers be the victims of firearm assaults? Third, what 
methodologies have been used to assess the theoretical and empirical 
validity of the deterrence doctrine? What problems have researchers 
encountered and, given these problems, what can be said about appropri­
ate methods for the study of deterrence?
The Deterrent Efficacy of Capital Punishment 
on the Homicide of Law Enforcement Officers
I.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The debate regarding the deterrent efficacy of the death penalty 
has intensified over the past fifteen years both within law and sociology. 
In a 1976 amicus curiae brief before the United States Supreme Court 
(Fowler v. N.C., 428 U.S. 904), economist Issac Ehrlich presented 
results from his research on the deterrent efficacy of capital punish­
ment. According to Ehrlich, his research showed that during the years 
between 1933 and 1969 each execution of a capital offender had deterred 
seven or eight other potential murders. The Supreme Court previously 
had decided not to listen to the results of deterrence research because 
the members believed that the general lack of statistical sophistication 
jeopardized the results (White, 1976: 8). However, in the decisions 
of Fowler and four companion cases, the Court declared that for many 
murderers capital punishment was a significant deterrent.
The acceptance of Ehrlich*s findings by the Court and the use 
of his results in the determination of capital punishment policy led to 
the reopening of research on the deterrent efficacy of the death penalty. 
The general consensus among sociologists previously had been that "exe­
cutions had no deterrent value." (McGahey, 1980: 486) This consensus 
was based on research by sociologists such as Sellin (1959, 1980),
Bowers (1974, 1975, 1980), and Bailey (1975, 1980) which consistently 
had shown no evidence of deterrence.
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3Various interest groups also have become involved in the death 
penalty debate. One particular group supporting the retention of capital 
punishment statutes has been law enforcement officers. Many officers be­
lieve that they are safer in death penalty states because individuals are 
less likely to commit a homicide in these states. They also have lobbied 
to have included in the statutes defining capital murder special clauses 
protecting law enforcement officers. That is, in any state with the death 
penalty, the killing of an officer would automatically be a capital homi­
cide punishable by death. These special clauses or provisions are meant 
to provide the officers with even greater protection from homicide.
The present research will examine whether the statutory presence, 
i.e., the threat of the death penalty, is a deterrent to the homicide of 
police officers. Secondary questions concern whether special provisions 
in capital statutes offer even greater protection to police and also 
whether the death penalty exhibits a "filtering" or "generalizing" deter­
rent effect upon lesser crimes, particularly on the rate of firearm 
assaults on police. Also of concern will be the extralegal or socio­
demographic factors that may have an impact on the homicide of police 
officers.
The next two chapters will examine the theoretical and method­
ological problems of deterrence research generally. The literature re­
garding the deterrent value of capital punishment also will be reviewed. 
This literature review will be organized around the methodologies of 
Thorsten Sellin and Issac Ehrlich, the two major disputants in the capi­
tal punishment debate. The fourth and fifth chapters will outline the - 
data sources and the methodology of the research and present the data 
analyses and a summary of the findings.
II.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF DETERRENCE, PROPERTIES OF PUNISHMENT,
AND EMPIRICAL PROBLEMS OF DETERRENCE RESEARCH
The Philosophy of Deterrence 
The legal sanctioning or punishment of convicted offenders is 
often justified by the presumption that punishment prevents crime.
There are several methods through which punishment is said to prevent 
crime. The most popular justifications concern retribution, reformation, 
and incapacitation of offenders. Gibbs writes (1975: 92-93) that there 
are at least nine other "possible preventive consequences," but a fre­
quent justification for sanctioning is its supposed deterrent effect. 
Classical criminologists such as Beccaria and Bentham wrote that the 
true purpose of punishing offenders was to deter both the individual 
offender (specific deterrence) and other individuals in the population 
from committing the same act (general deterrence)• The idea that 
punishment is a general deterrent to others in the population has been 
a major legal and sociological concept since the time of Becarria. It 
is the general deterrent effect of punishment, specifically capital 
punishment, that is of concern in the present research.
Classical criminologists of the Enlightenment era proposed 
reformation of the criminal law. Punishment frequently was imposed in 
an arbitrary and cruel manner. Both Beccaria and Bentham believed that 
the laws and the punishments inflicted were capricious and too cruelly
4
5applied to deter others from criminal behavior. Classical theorists 
accepted a view of humans as rational, calculating beings. That is, 
humans were seen as consciously weighing the costs and benefits, the 
pains and pleasures, that could result from their intended behaviors. 
According to this view, if the benefits or pleasures of an act appear 
to outweigh the possible costs or pains, individuals usually choose to 
follow through with the behavior. Conversely, if the consequent costs 
appear to be too great, they are deterred from the behavior. The 
classical school stated that if punishments were to deter individuals 
from criminal behavior, the crimes and their punishments must be specif­
ically defined by the state. Not only must the punishments be of a 
severity commensurate with the crime, they must be enforced uniformly, 
with certainty and swiftness. A uniform code of laws and enforcement 
enables individuals to more accurately assess the consequences of their 
behavior. Both classical and neoclassical theorists thus believed that 
the role of the law was to increase the costs, i.e., the threatened 
penalties, associated with specific behaviors just to the degree that 
most individuals would find the benefits to be reaped less than the 
possible costs of the threatened penalties.
The major difference between these schools of thought concerned 
the enforcement of punishments. While the classical theorists supported 
uniform, mandatory sentencing of violators, the neoclassists advocated 
greater flexibility in penalties. They believed that human behavior 
sometimes lacked rationality and that there should be some consideration 
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances surrounding the offense in 
the sentencing process (Glaser, 1975: 38).
6In later years, deterrence arguments regarding punishment waned 
as positivistic thought began to dominate sociological theorizing. 
Criminologists began to shift their focus from an examination of laws 
and the legal system and accept a view of crime and criminality as the 
result of individual pathologies. The goal of sanctioning became 
reformation and treatment of the individual because offenders were now 
seen as flawed or defective humans. These goals were expressed in the 
development of the American penal system. Both the Pennsylvania and 
Auburn "systems” of corrections focused on the offender. Although the 
practices varied somewhat by the type of system adhered to, the basic 
philosophy was one of individual reformation. This task was to be 
accomplished through a combination of silence and harsh discipline 
(Duffee and Fitch, 1976: 119-120). Although it appears that deterrence 
may no longer have been a salient justification for punishment, the 
concept of deterrence remained "in evidence at the core of our legis­
lation and throughout our judicial proceedings." (Anderson, 1976: 29)
As such, it has continued as an important issue for sociological theory 
and research.
Definitions of Deterrence 
There are many conceptual definitions of deterrence. Most 
frequently, these definitions are unclear or too broadly used to dis­
tinguish conceptually between deterrence and other preventive effects 
of punishment (Gibbs and Erickson, 1976: 299). Gibbs writes (1975: 3) 
that the problem "is not that social scientists have clearly different 
conceptions of deterrence, rather they commonly write with an uncritical 
conception, even to the point of the avoiding an explicit definition."
7These definitional problems, widely acknowledged in the literature on 
deterrence, are reflected clearly in our level of theorizing about 
deterrence. Gibbs states (1975: 5) that we should not write of a 
deterrence "theory" because the level of theorizing has not risen above 
that of early classical theorists. There are, according to Gibbs, no 
clearly defined, empirically-derived propositions that sponsor a deter­
rence theory. Rather, the literature presents only a vague conceptual­
ization of deterrence, a congeries of questions relating to its proper­
ties and dimensions, and one proposition (1975: 5): "The rate for
a particular type of crime varies inversely with the celerity, the 
certainty, and the severity of punishment for that type of crime."
Thus Gibbs refers to the present knowledge of deterrence as a "doctrine," 
not a theory. I agree with Gibbs and also will refrain from the use of 
the term theory. I will instead refer to the deterrence doctrine or 
hypothesis.
The definitions of deterrence are closely linked to those of 
law and the purposes of legal sanctioning as given by the legal system. 
Moreover, it is through the mechanisms of the legal system that punish­
ments are defined and enforced. An examination of the various concep­
tual definitions of law, legal sanctioning, and deterrence reveal how 
intimately these concepts are tied. These definitions at times seem 
virtually indistinct. For example, deterrence has been conceptually 
defined in the literature as the "general preventive effects" of law 
and as "an instance where an individual refrains from an act because 
he or she perceives a risk of punishment for the act and fears that 
punishment." (Gibbs and Erickson, 1976: 299) Gibbs writes (1975: 3, 
note 5) that deterrence is both the threat of punishment and the
8response to that threat. Deterrence, then, is essentially "the omission 
of an act" (Gibbs, 1975: 2). The "omission" is a psychological process 
and occurs in response to the perception of threatened punishment 
(Sellin, 1980: 84).
Turning to definitions of law, the law has been conceptualized 
as a moralizer, a restrainer or suppressor of deviance, and a socializ­
ing agent (Rich, 1978). It is implied that the law, through the threat 
and the use of punishment, is a mechanism of social control. Both 
legalists and positivists view social processes as controllable (Turk, 
1979: 18). Again, the underlying assumption of human rationality is 
apparent in the conceptualizations of both law and deterrence. Feeley 
writes (1978: 14) that most social scientists conceptualize the law as 
"a command or order to do or refrain from doing some specified act, and 
is distinguished by the threat of physical coercion attached to the 
order." As such, the law defines acts or situations that will result in 
legal sanctioning. Legal rules become a method of handling and coping 
with deviance in our society (Jeffrey, 1979: 35). Our legal system is 
centered on this presumption that legal control of social processes 
is necessary. As Turk writes (1979: 18) this "control is a means of 
allowing imperfect beings to live tolerably with one another." Thus 
it is presumed that legal control or "the use of coercion through the 
threat or use of deadly violence" (Hoebel, 1954) makes most humans 
law-abiding. That is, individuals are deterred from those acts and 
situations which would set the legal machinery into responsive action 
because they fear the threat and use of the sanctions.
But what about the process of deterrence as it relates to the 
law? Legal scholars often implicitly accept a deterrence philosophy
9in their discussions of how the law operates as a preventive mechanism.
For example, Feeley writes (1976: 27):
The basic aspect of law and social control is found in the 
unheralded response and anticipation to abstract sets of rules 
which intrude in the lives of people and get them to do things 
they would otherwise not do. . . . The genius and the power and 
the importance of legal authority is precisely because it is 
self-applying and self-motivating. . . . the law is most often 
set in motion by people who apply it to themselves and to each 
other without benefit of explicit mobilization of legal insti­
tutions .
Feeley is saying, essentially, that individuals interpret the command 
and the threat of sanctioning as it might be applied to themselves.
They choose to obey the command as a response to this threat. The focus 
on the general preventive effects of punishment seems to be "more con­
cerned with the psychology of those obedient to the law than with the 
psychology of criminals." (Andenaes, 1966: 950) Again, deterrence 
is viewed most often as a psychological process that results in the 
omission of behavior.
Dimensions of Punishment 
The deterrence doctrine highlights three dimensions of punish­
ment hypothesized to have an impact on its deterrent efficacy —  celer­
ity, certainty, and severity. It is hypothesized that each of these 
dimensions is necessary to harness the full deterrent power of punish­
ment. That is, punishment must be swift, certain, and of sufficient 
severity for it to be a general deterrent. Yet, theorists have hypothe­
sized also that each of these three dimensions of punishment have 
objective and subjective qualities that may contribute to deterrent 
efficacy. Specifically, punishment has objective qualities of severity, 
celerity, and certainty —  how the crimes and their punishments are
10
prescribed in statutes and how the punishments are actually used. But 
these qualities may be perceived quite differently by individuals in the 
population. Beyeveld writes (1979: 213) that "as deterrence has been 
defined it is always the potential offender's beliefs about sanctions 
that are the crucial variables." Anderson states (1979: 124) that "if 
people are deterred, this is a function of their perceptions of legal 
consequences, rather than a function of the objective [dimensions of] 
sanctions."
It is also important to note that there are different "levels" 
of sanctioning. Blumstein et al. define four levels of legal sanction­
ing: arrest, conviction, imprisonment, and execution. Individuals may
perceive the probabilities and severity of these sanctions differently 
and thus respond quite differently to the threat. For example, the 
threat and probability of arrest for a specific act is a substantial 
deterrent for many people; only the threat of imprisonment may have a 
deterrent effect for others (1978: 20).
Most deterrence research has been confined to investigating the 
objective qualities of punishment because of the difficulty in measuring 
the perceptual qualities associated with each of these dimensions 
(Gibbs, 1975: 148-9, note 2). It is generally assumed by researchers 
that the subjective perceptions of punishment accurately reflect the 
objective reality. Consequently, the deterrence hypothesis as it is 
generally tested "assumes potential offenders are predictably sensitive 
to the actual range of variation in certainty and severity of legal 
punishments" (Bowers and Pierce, 1980: 454) and "adjust to and cope with 
[the] increased or decreased costs of pursuing their own interests." 
(Feeley, 1976: 30) As such, deterrence researchers have most often
11
focused on the prescribed objective dimensions of punishment as they 
are defined in the statutes and then compared crime rates among juris­
dictions with different statutes.
Researchers acknowledge the importance of certainty and celerity 
of punishment for deterrent efficacy. Yet few have concentrated their 
research efforts in these areas because of the problems associated with 
operationalizing these concepts. For example, how would one determine 
whether a punishment was swift or certain enough to be a deterrent? 
Again, it would be necessary to tap into the perceptual qualities 
associated with each of these dimensions —  a task that is hindered by 
a paucity of data. Also, preliminary investigations into the objective 
dimensions of celerity and certainty have produced mixed and tentative 
results at best.
Most research has focused only on the severity of punishment, 
particularly the objective severity of punishment as prescribed in the 
law. This focus on prescribed severity usually concerns only the death 
penalty because the threat of death and the actual use of the penalty is 
believed to be the ultimate deterrent. According to Sellin (1980: 78), 
"The belief that the death penalty is the supreme deterrent to murder 
is a hardy perennial deeply planted in the human mind and nourished by 
emotions." Thus the concept of deterrence is often used as a justifi­
cation for the retention and enforcement of the death penalty in the 
United States. It is assumed that all humans fear their own death, and 
as such will choose to forego commission of a murderous act in order to 
avoid the threatened penalty. This assumption of human rationality and 
the belief that human behavior is influenced by costs and benefits leads 
to the general prediction that an increase in the statutory severity for
12
an offense will result in a decline in the rate of the offense. Thus it 
is the mechanism of deterrence through which the retention and use of 
the death penalty is said to reduce the number of homicides committed.
A theoretic issue as yet relatively unexplored in the empirical 
research on deterrence concerns the "generalizing" or "filtering" deter­
rent effect of capital punishment on lesser, but related, offenses 
(Beyleveld, 1979: 211). Bailey (1975) hypothesized that the same
causal factors may be responsible for both lethal and non-lethal assaults, 
that is, a homicide may be merely an assault gone wrong. Consequently, 
a deterrent effect may be evidenced in death penalty states; the fear of 
the penalty may make individuals cautious about their involvement in 
assaultive situations that could result in a death. Bowers hypothesized 
(1974: 159) that deterrence
. . .  is generalized to all major forms of criminal behavior, 
including both capital and lesser offenses; it shows that society 
"means business" in combating crime across the board.
Thus it may be that not only does the presence of the death penalty
lessen the homicide rate, it also contributes to a decrease in the
general aggravated assault rate.
Empirical Problems of Deterrence Research 
The theoretical issues associated with defining deterrence and 
its various properties and dimensions have been outlined. These theo­
retical issues also have created methodological problems that are 
reflected in the operationalization of the major concepts, model speci­
fication, the choice of data sources, appropriate methods of analysis, 
and interpretation of the findings. The deterrence literature of the 
past fifteen years has focused primarily on these methodological issues.
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The separate research of two individuals, Issac Ehrlich and Thorsten 
Sellin, has often been at the center of the debate concerning the 
deterrent value of capital punishment. Before examining the research 
of Sellin and Ehrlich, as well as subsequent studies using their metho­
dologies, it is necessary to consider the major methodological problems 
generally encountered in deterrence research.
Data Sources and Construction of Crime Rates 
Most deterrence researchers use aggregate data for one-year 
time periods, the most frequent source of data being the Uniform Crime 
Reports (UCR). The UCR is published annually by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and is considered to contain the official statistics 
on crime in the United States. The UCR data are obtained from individual 
police departments across the country. A variety of problems stem from 
the use of aggregate data, particularly data from the UCR. These prob­
lems, which present serious complications in the design and analysis 
of deterrence research, are outlined below.
One problem concerns the use of crime rates, per se, to study 
deterrence. Meier and Johnson point out (1977: 295) that the use of 
crime data may be wholly inappropriate for two specific reasons. The 
first is that the use of crime rate data ignores the possibility of 
other sources of conformity. Second, the crime rate indicates only 
those who have not been deterred. Thus, certain inferences must be 
made.
It must be presumed, for example, that the reciprocal of the crime 
rate —  the rate of nonviolation —  constitutes the "deterrence 
rate." But, the rate of nonviolation may actually reflect two 
sources of compliance: (1) compliance produced by influences
other than a legal threat and (2) compliance produced by legal 
threats —  deterrence.
14
Thus, the use of official crime data may not adequately reflect the 
phenomena under study.
Several problems are directly related to the use of UCR crime 
data. First is the variation and inconsistency in the number of police 
departments reporting data each year. For example, the number of report­
ing departments in any state may increase or decrease over the years, 
although the trend is generally toward an increase. This situation 
occurs as more departments agree to maintain and submit their crime data 
to the FBI. But an increase in the number of departments reporting will 
be reflected in an increase in the total number of reported crimes. In 
some studies, this increase has been interpreted as an actual rise in 
the crime rate, rather than as an artifact of increased UCR coverage. 
Clearly, this type of interpretation would hamper the validity of the 
findings on deterrence from these data.
The second problem of UCR data concerns the reporting and record­
ing of offenses within and among police departments. Victimization 
studies indicate that most crime is either undetected or unreported to 
the police. As such, the official crime rate as reported in the UCR is 
generally assumed to grossly underestimate the total amount of crime. 
Also, discretionary decisions made by officers in the field often deter­
mine whether a specific crime is actually recorded, as well as whether 
a suspect is arrested for the offense. In addition to inaccuracies 
regarding the true level of crime that occurs, statutory definitions and 
recording of specific offenses vary across jurisdictions. For example, 
an aggravated assault in one jurisdiction may be recorded as a simple 
assault in another.
15
Studies on the deterrent efficacy of capital punishment most 
often use UCR data on homicides despite the problems listed above. It 
is generally assumed that most homicides are detected and accurately 
reported to and recorded by police departments to a greater degree than 
less serious crimes. According to Geerken and Gove (1977: 427) this 
assumption is not wholly incorrect because murder, as well as aggravated 
assault, tend to be reported and cleared by arrest much more often than 
other crimes. These crimes may more likely be reported, recorded, and 
suspects apprehended because they are considered serious violations of 
the community's mores. But the major problem with the UCR homicide data 
is that the homicide rates reflect all homicides, those classified as 
capital offenses and possibly punishable by death as well as those that 
are non-capital homicides. Because the homicide rate is generally the 
dependent variable in studies of deterrence and capital punishment, 
these inaccuracies could jeopardize the validity of the research results. 
It is generally assumed that the proportion of all homicides that are 
actually capital offenses remains stable across time and jurisdictions 
(Sellin, 1980: 123; Bowers, 1974: 140). This assumption is problematic 
because it is not supported with data describing the proportion of 
UCR reported homicides that are actually capital homicides (Bailey,
1975: 672).
As mentioned, the accurate construction of the dependent vari­
able in deterrence research is hampered by the use of official crime 
data. Both Blumstein et al. (1978) and Brier and Fienberg (1980) 
criticize the use of aggregate data generally, stating that these data 
may inhibit a finding of deterrence. Noting the limitation of aggregate 
data on crime, both sources suggest that researchers use data that more
16
carefully separate different types of homicide, use smaller units 
of observation (e.g., cities or counties rather than states), and data 
collection periods shorter than one year (Brier and Fienberg, 1980: 151; 
Blumstein et al., 1978: 62). These and other problems associated with 
UCR reporting and recording present obvious and substantial obstacles to 
deterrence research. Yet most often these problems can only be noted by 
researchers because other sources of data are either not available or 
are not considered to be as reliable as the UCR. The issue of sources 
of data will be explored in greater depth when the literature on deter­
rence and capital punishment is reviewed in the following section.
Model Specification 
Another problem of deterrence research concerns model specifi­
cation. The deterrence doctrine is usually postulated as a general 
statement inferring that the crime rate will vary inversely with the 
level of sanctioning (i.e., the certainty, celerity, and severity of 
punishment). This statement may be illustrated as a negative relation­
ship of the form:
Sanction Crime Rate
S/C ---------------------  C/P
(S^Sanctioning, C=Total Reported Crimes, P=Total Population)
Sanctioning could be operationalized in a variety of manners.
For example, it could be measured as the total number of individuals 
arrested, convicted, or sentenced relative to the total number of crimes 
reported. Or it could reflect the total number arrested, convicted, or 
sentenced for a specific crime relative to the incidence of that crime 
in the population.
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The problem of this form is that of correlation of ratios with 
common terms. Specifically, C (the total number of reported offenses) 
appears on both sides of the equation, in both the numerator of the 
crime rate and in the denominator of the sanction variable. Thus, "any 
variation in the reporting or the recording of rates across units of 
observation could cause a negative association." (Blumstein et al., 
1978: 24) The negative results may be then interpreted as a showing of 
a deterrent effect where none may actually exist.
In addition, the denominator, P (total population) may be an 
inaccurate and misleading number. For example, the rate of rapes 
(statutorily confined to offenses against females) is often constructed 
as the total number of rapes per 1,000 (or 10,000; 100,000; etc.) popu­
lation. Clearly, all of the population is not at risk of being a victim 
of rape since this number also includes males. It may be also that the 
risk of being murdered or becoming a murderer varies by "the sex, age, 
race, and other possible attributes of a person." (Sellin, 1980: 131) 
Yet, in regard to the homicide rate, it is often assumed that everyone 
in the population is equally at risk. Thus the construction of any 
specific crime rate using the total population as the denominator may 
not accurately reflect the true rate of crime for those persons actually 
at risk.
Another problem of model specification concerns the effect of 
crime rates on sanction levels. That is, because there is an increase 
in the rate of a particular crime, the level of sanctioning for that 
crime may also increase. As the increased sanctioning is communicated 
to the general population, there may result, through deterrence, a 
decrease in the crime rate. Increased rates of crime may also cause a
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lowering of sanction rates because the power of the system to respond 
adequately to the increased burden is significantly reduced. "When this 
inverse effect is operating in addition to the deterrent effect, crime 
and sanctions are said to be simultaneously related." (Blumstein et al., 
1978: 25). Accordingly, these authors state (1978: 30): "If the effect
of crime rates on sanction levels is assumed to be small, then nonsimul- 
taneous estimation techniques are appropriate, and a major obstacle to 
interpreting a negative association as a deterrent is overcome."
Because of the difficulty of specifying a priori a model of 
simultaneous interaction, most researchers assume a nonsimultaneous 
equation for the testing of deterrence. That is, they look only at the 
effect of sanction levels on the crime rates. Although one may question 
the validity of accepting this nonsimultaneous assumption, this approach 
appears to be more consistent with the general deterrence philosophy 
that certain changes in some property of punishment should be followed 
by a change in the crime rate. In a simultaneous equation, the form 
would incorporate the assumption that "a change in the properties 
of punishment may be a response to changes in the crime rate" (Gibbs, 
1975: 157).
As was stated previously, most research on deterrence has con­
centrated on the objective severity of punishment rather than certainty 
or celerity. Yet we assume that the death penalty is perceived as the 
most severe punishment. Thus to some small degree we are focusing on 
the perceptual property of the severity of punishment (Gibbs, 1975: 149). 
In addition, most capital punishment research examines only the pre­
scribed punishment (i.e., death penalty statutes) and whether variations 
in abolition or retention affect the homicide rates within or among
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jurisdictions. It is the threat of punishment that is said to offer 
protection to the population. Since the focus of most of the debate 
on capital punishment concerns the impact of abolition or retention of 
the penalty, research on changes in homicide rates before and after 
retention or abolition most clearly addresses this issue. For example, 
only three executions occurred in the United States during the years 
included in the present research (Gilmore in 1977, Spenklink and Bishop 
in 1979). Yet it was during these same years that the Supreme Court 
clarified the constitutionality requirements of capital sentences and 
the individual states revised their laws to conform to these rulings. 
Consequently, the threat of receiving a capital sentence and that 
sentence being executed should have been enhanced. If the threat of 
capital punishment is a deterrent, there should be a resulting decrease 
in the homicide rates during these years.
III.
THE DETERRENT EFFICACY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
The Sellin-Ehrlich Debate 
The methodologies and findings of Sellin and Ehrlich generally 
have been the central focus of the recent debate over the deterrent 
efficacy of the death penalty. This review of the literature is organ­
ized around their findings as well as adaptations, replications, and 
criticisms because the present research adopts and tests these different 
methodologies. I first outline the structure of the debate between 
these two authors, then describe the general consensus in the literature 
regarding the deterrent effect of capital punishment.
Methodology and Findings: Thorsten Sellin
Sellin writes (1980: 132) that his studies on capital punishment
have
. . . looked for its effects over time on the rates of death due 
to homicide in death penalty states and have compared these rates 
with those of neighboring abolition states on the assumption that 
states in such clusters would be reasonably alike in the makeup 
of their populations and their socioeconomic characteristics.
The basic Sellin methodology is thus a "matching'’ of contiguous states 
assumed to be demographically similar, the major difference among the 
states being that at least one has abolished capital punishment. He 
then compares homicide rates among the states. According to the deter­
rence doctrine, if deterrence is operating in the general population,
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those states that have abolished the death penalty should have higher 
rates of homicide than the neighboring retentionist states. Sellin has 
completed many comparisons of the crude homicide rates among different 
"clusters1' of abolition and retention states. He has found in each of 
his studies that the homicide rates in abolition and retention states 
are extremely similar. He has concluded consistently that his findings 
indicate that "executions have no discernible effect on homicide death 
rates." (1959: 34)
Sellin has completed several studies using different sources of 
data. In his most recent book, The Penalty of Death, published in 1980, 
he discusses the variety of data sources available to researchers. He 
examines in particular the data available from UCR and those from the 
National Office of Vital Statistics (Vital Statistics of the United 
States). Sellin compares the willful homicide rate of the UCR and homi­
cide death rate of the Vital Statistics and states that "the decision on 
which series to use in deterrence studies is still a toss-up, since for 
most states . . . either series would seem equally acceptable" (1980: 
137). Sellin most often chooses to use the homicide death rates pro­
vided by the National Office of Vital Statistics.
Methodology and Findings: Issac Ehrlich
It is the research of economist Issac Ehrlich that has drawn
attention to several substantive and methodological issues of deterrence
research. Most economists concurred with sociologists about the absence
of a deterrent effect prior to Ehrlich's 1975(a) study. Gibbs writes
(1975: 206-7) that this concurrence
is significant even though economists and sociologists have used 
essentially the same data . . . .  because economists have used
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much more sophisticated statistical techniques and because stan­
dards of evidence are not necessarily the same in all disciplines.
Ehrlich's research is based on the application of econometric 
models and sophisticated statistical techniques to the study of human 
behavior. Ehrlich, rather than comparing the homicide rates between 
abolition and retentionist states, considers "the actual enforcement 
of the death penalty, which may be a far more important factor affecting 
offenders' behavior than the legal status of the penalty." (1975a: 415) 
McGahey writes (1980: 487), "Ehrlich developed a mathematical model of 
the determinants of homicide rates assuming that murderous behavior can 
be viewed as maximization of personal utility subject to the constraints 
of possible punishment."
In order to support his thesis that the actual imposition of 
the death penalty is a deterrent to crime, Ehrlich, using a time-series 
analysis, calculated an aggregate homicide rate for the years 1933-1969. 
He then correlated this with the "execution risk" or the proportion of 
those convicted of murder who were actually executed during these years. 
Ehrlich wanted to isolate a "pure deterrent effect" by controlling for 
the impact of variables other than the execution risk on the aggregate 
homicide rate. Ehrlich used multivariate regression techniques to 
control for other factors he hypothesized to be determinants of the 
homicide rate.
The variables included in Ehrlich's regression equations were: 
the conditional probabilities of conviction given arrest and execution 
given conviction; civilian labor force participation; civilian labor 
force unemployment; residential population between the ages of 14-24; 
an estimate of permanent per capita income; non-white residential
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population; total civilian population; per capita government expendi­
tures; and per capita expenditures on police (1975a: 409). The variable 
selected for inclusion in the analyses reflect assumptions that crime 
levels are affected by population density factors and economic condi­
tions. Ehrlich experimented with different equation forms as well as 
different measures of execution risk in his analyses (McGahey, 1980).
Ehrlich1s data were obtained from the UCR. Ehrlich writes 
(1975b: 212) that UCR data are "conceptually superior" to those obtained 
by Sellin from the Office of Vital Statistics. He writes (1975b: 212) 
that the
FBI category is defined to include only willful felonious homicides 
while . . . .  the homicide data of the Vital Statistics explicitly 
include justifiable homicides and are likely to include some negli­
gent manslaughters as well.
Ehrlich’s original "simple correlation between the reported 
murder rate and estimates of the objective risk of execution given 
conviction of murder [was] positive in sign." (1975a: 409) That is, as 
the execution risk increased, so did the homicide rate, clearly not a 
showing of deterrence. But, he writes (1975a: 409) that when he incor­
porated through regression analysis the effects of
apprehension, conviction, unemployment, and labor force partici­
pation . . . .  the results change substantively and are found 
to be in accordance with the theoretical predictions and statis­
tically meaningful . . .
The relationship between the homicide rate and the sanction variables
had become negative, thus supporting the general deterrence doctrine.
He estimated that (Baldus and Cole, 1975: 173)
the elasticity of the homicide rate with respect to the execution 
rate was approximately -.06 —  that is, a .06 decrease in the 
homicide rate was associated with a one percent increase in the 
execution risk.
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It was from these data that he concluded that for the years examined 
"an additional execution per year . . . may have resulted, on average, 
in 7 or 8 fewer murders" (Ehrlich, 1975a: 414).
Critique of the Research 
of Sellin and Ehrlich
Serious criticism has been directed at the theoretical and 
methodological problems of both Sellin's and Ehrlich's research.
Several researchers have attempted to replicate their studies and 
evaluate the validity of their contradictory findings. In this section, 
these replications and evaluations are reviewed.
Sellin
Sellin's methodology, comparing homicide rates among contiguous 
states, has been criticized on several grounds. Tullock writes (1974: 
103) that the design of Sellin's studies seems rather crude or primitive. 
According to Peck (1976) the selection of contiguous states is based 
on a subjective and intuitive process. The assumption that contiguous 
states are relatively similar in their demographic composition may be 
an inaccurate and imperfect method for controlling for the influence of 
extralegal factors. But Sellin asserts (1980: 170) "the remarkable 
similarity of the amounts and trends of the [homicide] rates in the 
clusters suggests that the assumption is not completely gratuitous." 
Sellin uses, in essence, a method of agreement in his analyses.
Moreover, Baldus and Cole in a similar research design attempted to 
hold constant the influence of several socioeconomic and demographic 
variables in a contiguous state analysis. They used as control vari­
ables: labor force participation, rate of unemployment, population
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between the ages of 15-24, real per capita income, percent non-white 
population, total civilian population, per capita government expendi­
tures, and per capita police expenditures (1975: 177-179). These 
authors write that "differences in these factors among the states in 
each group are generally small and, more importantly, that they do 
not explain the differences in the observed homicide rates." (1975:
177, note 30; see also Sellin, 1980: 175)
Bailey (1975) completed a contiguous state analysis on murder 
and capital punishment, operationalizing the dependent variable as the 
admissions to state prisons for first and second degree murder for the 
period under study. From these figures he computed a total murder rate. 
He also compared these figures with UCR reported homicide rates. He 
concludes from his analysis (1975: 677) that the "rates for all four 
offenses [first and second degree murder, total murder, and homicide] 
are generally higher in death penalty jurisdictions." In an attempt 
to control for extralegal factors, Bailey examined socioeconomic and 
demographic factors for similarity. The following variables were 
included in his analysis: median family income, median education,
percentage non-white population, percentage of the population between 
the ages 18-44, total population, population density, and percentage 
residing in metropolitan areas (1975: 678). He concluded that all four 
offenses are consistently higher for retentionist states at all levels 
of income and education. The same also held true for all the demo­
graphic variables (1975: 679).
William Bowers, in his book Executions in America (1974), 
examines the effect of the 1967 judicial moratorium on executions, the 
general decline in executions prior to that time, and the differential
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impact of mandatory and discretionary capital sentencing (1974: 137-39), 
Bowers used data obtained from a 1972 Wolfgang study containing infor­
mation on abolition and retention between the years of 1963 and 1970. 
Bowers also added 1971 data that had been unavailable to Wolfgang at the 
time of his study (1974: 139). Regarding those states that had shifted 
from mandatory to discretionary capital sentencing, Bowers indicates 
that his contiguous states analysis shows neither evidence of deterrence 
nor signs of an increase in the homicide rates because of the moratorium 
on executions. These findings lend no support to the belief that 
mandatory capital sentences are a more powerful deterrent (1974: 152).
Commenting on the homicide rate over the years as well as the 
impact of the moratorium, Bowers writes that executions have declined 
steadily while homicide rates have remained somewhat constant over 
the last thirty years. The yearly decline in and the moratorium on 
executions did not seem to produce a "corresponding rise in homicides" 
(1974: 159). Thus in his contiguous state analysis, Bowers "find[s] 
no evidence to suggest that the death penalty is a uniquely deterrent 
form of punishment." (1974: 145)
Baldus and Cole (1975) compared the methodologies of Sellin and 
Ehrlich. Although they acknowledge criticisms of Sellin's methodology 
as simplistic or primitive, they write (1975: 1973) that "because of 
inadequacies of data or theory" simpler methods may be better used to 
study many questions. In their analysis of Ehrlich's work, examined 
in the following section, they assert that statistical sophistication 
such as that used by Ehrlich "is no cure for flaws in model construction 
and research design." (1975: 173) With those ideas in mind, I now
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outline the criticisms of Ehrlich's work and the results of several 
replications and reanalyses of his data.
Ehrlich
Ehrlich1s research is based on a microeconomic model of human 
behavior derived initially from a rational utility analysis of economic 
behavior. Economic thought can be reduced to one assertion when applied 
to crime, "Individuals engage in criminal activity to the extent that it 
is profitable." (Gibbs, 1975: 203) Specifically, this means that humans 
respond to incentives; potential murderers calculate the possible gains 
or losses that may be incurred through their behavior. These ideas 
clearly hold with classical conceptions regarding the rationality of 
human behavior. Also, potential offenders are assumed to be sensitive 
to the probabilities of arrest, conviction, and execution that may 
result from a murderous act. Ehrlich supports his theoretical and 
methodological perspective on deterrence research by asserting that 
(1975a: 398)
the application of the econometric approach to criminality 
and identification of relative determinants of murder and 
their empirical counterparts permit a more systematic test of 
the existence of a differential deterrent effect of capital 
punishment [than that of previous research].
Although the econometric approach may offer insight into human 
behavior, it has been criticized by several researchers. Gibbs writes 
(1975: 203) that economists come to the study of deterrence "armed with 
an elegant conceptual scheme." Yet he also points out (1975: 204) that 
"No economist has specified how the cost of an actual punishment is to 
be expressed numerically, let alone in monetary units." Klein et al. 
(1978: 343) specifically criticize Ehrlich1s research stating that his
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"use of nonexperiraental data and the attempt to deal with simultaneity
give some superficial resemblances to econometrics." They continue by
stating that they (1978: 343)
find his theory strongly contrived, i.e., set up in an essentially 
imitative way vis a vis the design of economic theory that is used 
to generate specification of econometric models. We have doubts 
about the insight that this approach is likely to bring to an 
understanding of criminal behavior.
The hesitancy voiced by these authors about applying econometric models
to human behavior is echoed repeatedly in the deterrence literature (see
Bowers and Pierce, 1980; Brier and Fienberg, 1980).
Several researchers criticize Ehrlich1s use of aggregate data 
(see Bowers and Pierce, 1975; Brier and Fienberg, 1980; Sellin, 1980). 
The aggregation he uses causes several methodological problems and calls 
serious attention to the validity of his findings. First, the aggrega­
tion of the execution risk and the homicide rate over the years 1933 to 
1969 nullifies the showing of any regional differences in deterrence. 
This is a serious flaw considering the variations in the number of 
executions and death sentences that occur throughout the states. The 
southern states in particular have often sentenced and imposed this 
penalty more frequently than have non-southern states. Second, Baldus 
and Cole write (1975: 174) that "in the debate over abolition, the 
essential question is the effect of changing from a retentionist to 
an abolitionist jurisdiction." The use of aggregated national data 
obscures this distinction. Ehrlich had criticized Sellin for ignoring 
the actual use of the death penalty because some of the retentionist 
states in his studies rarely imposed the penalty and could be considered 
to be de facto abolition states (1975a: 415). But, again Baldus and 
Cole believe Sellin's study more adequately addresses the question
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regarding the effect of abolition or retention of the death penalty.
Klein et al. (1978: 338, note 2) also point out that "the perception of 
the risk of execution in a retentionist state that only rarely uses 
capital punishment may greatly exceed that in an abolitionist state, 
even though the relative frequencies of execution are similar in the 
two states." These authors obtained Ehrlich1s data and were able to 
replicate his results up to rounding error. Yet they believed Ehrlich*s 
findings were biased as to the form of the equation and the variables 
included. Thus they also support Sellin*s methodology in this instance. 
According to Gibbs and Erickson (1976: 307), the question to be addressed 
in present-day research concerns the "relation between the statutory 
provision for the death penalty and capital crimes when the objective 
certainty is minimal." (Gibbs, 1975: 307) Again, it is necessary to 
point out that it is the presence of a capital punishment statute, i.e., 
the threat of severe legal punishment, that is presumed to be the deter­
rent to crime.
Ehrlich* s research has been criticized also for the use of UCR 
data, as well as for his choice and construction of the independent and 
dependent variables. Bowers and Pierce (1975: 187-192) provide the most 
critical examination of Ehrlich*s data. In addition to the general 
problems associated with the UCR that were described in a previous 
section, these authors outline the specific flaws in the data that bias 
Ehrlich's study to a finding of deterrence. They write (1975: 188) that 
the "national homicide statistics collected in the early years . . . 
are unreliable." Brier and Fienberg state more strongly (1980: 158) 
that they "do not believe that UCR data collected prior to 1960 merit 
serious attention since they are almost completely unreliable; they are
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subject to enormous errors and biases." In addition, although Ehrlich 
writes that he used "readjusted" estimates regarding the homicide rate 
for earlier years (1975a: 406, note 1), Bowers and Pierce point out 
(1975: 188) that the methods of readjustments have not been published by 
the FBI and that, "In any case, the readjustment of figures for as long 
ago as 40 years on the basis of the current homicide levels of agencies 
recently added to the sample is of dubious value." These authors suggest 
that researchers use the willful homicide figures that are mandated by 
state law and maintained by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.
Bowers and Pierce (1975, 1980), as well as Brier and Fienberg 
(1980), also call attention to Ehrlich's use of the UCR arrest and 
conviction data. Bowers and Pierce state (1975: 190-192) that the rates 
used by Ehrlich are unreliable because (1) they are based on small, 
unrepresentative samples of police departments, (2) the number of 
departments reporting convictions did not exceed 300 until the 1960s,
(3) the number reporting arrests did not reach 2,000 (only one-fourth 
of the total reporting) until the 1960s, and (4) the size of the juris­
dictions reporting conviction data substantially declined during the 
1960s and the late 1930s. Brier and Feinberg (1980: 176) add that the 
data necessary to calculate the probability of conviction "were not 
available for odd years from 1933-1951. Ehrlich estimated these values 
by a regression technique that he does not describe." Since the execu­
tion risk, as computed by Ehlich, uses the homicide, arrest, and con­
viction data provided by the UCR, it may be that the execution risk is 
inadequately represented in his analysis (Bowers and Pierce, 1975: 192).
The mathematical form of the equations Ehrlich used and the years 
included in his analyses have drawn attention among many researchers.
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Bowers and Pierce (1975), using a data set similar to that of Ehrlich, 
were unable to exactly replicate his findings. They write that they 
"find that his evidence of deterrence emerges only under restrictive 
assumptions about the form of the relationships among the variables and 
only under a narrow selection of the time period for analysis." (1975: 
192-193) Also they write (1975: 197-198) that the deterrent effect 
observed by Ehrlich for the years 1933-1969 "disappears when the five 
most recent years [1964-1969] are removed." It was during these five 
years when the UCR-reported homicide rate increased rapidly and the 
number of executions dropped sharply. Klein et al. write (1978: 345) 
that the real strength of Ehrlich's work "lies in the simple graph of 
the upsurge of the homicide rate after 1962, coupled with the fall in 
the execution rate in the same period." Research by Bowers and Pierce 
(1975), Baldus and Cole (1975), Passell and Taylor (1977), Forst (1977), 
and Klein et al. (1978) consistently indicate that the inclusion of the 
1960s data are crucial to a finding of deterrence when using Ehrlich's 
model.
Several researchers have also questioned Ehrlich's use of log- 
linear mathematical transformations. Baldus and Cole (1975: 181) write 
that the use of logarithms may skew the results to a finding of deter­
rence. Bowers and Pierce state (1975: 199-200) that
the last few years of the time series, which are apparently 
responsible for the evidence of a deterrent effect when loga­
rithmic values are used, yield no such evidence with the natural 
values of the variables.
Hence, they conclude that "Ehrlich's evidence is strictly a statistical
artifact, not the reflection of a deterrent effect over the entire time
period of analysis or the most recent subperiod."
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Passell and Taylor (1977) also tried to replicate Ehrlich*s 
findings. Their conclusions are also sensitive to the mathematical form
of the equation. They state that the deterrent effect disappeared when
raw numbers, rather than logarithms, were used. Bowers and Pierce 
(1975: 197) and McGahey (1980: 497) comment on the necessity for testing 
the robustness of the deterrence results over different time periods and 
in different mathematical forms. McGahey writes (1980: 491, note 21) 
that
in time series work, if the equation accurately describes 
behavior for the whole period, then it should show similar
results for subperiods. Otherwise, the underlying relationship
may have changed over time. Similar concerns are involved with 
different functional forms; . • . alternate mathematical forms 
of the equation . . . should show like results.
In addition to these criticisms, Baldus and Cole (1975) question 
the use of multiple regression analysis. They write (1975: 180) that 
although this statistical technique does offer greater precision, it is 
"best suited to testing a hypothesis based on a well-developed theory 
which isolates a few determinants of the variable under study."
Multiple Regression Analysis 
and Deterrence Research
Few social scientists investigating deterrence had used multiple 
regression analysis before Ehrlich. Notable among these few studies are 
the works of Gray and Martin (1969) and Bean and Cushing (1971).
Gray and Martin focused their research on previous analyses done 
by Gibbs (1968) in which he had concluded that certainty rather than 
severity is a more important aspect of punishment for deterrence efficacy. 
Gibbs had used chi-square techniques and Gray and Martin believed that 
regression analysis would be more appropriate (1969: 392). They write
33
that their research using regression analysis of Gibb's data indicated 
that severity and certainty of punishment are of equal importance 
(1968: 394).
Bean and Cushing (1971) completed a reanalysis of Gibbs data 
because they felt that neither Gibbs nor other researchers had "fully 
exploited all the information in the data." (1971: 279) They write that 
chi-square analysis may be inappropriate because it may incorrectly 
state the association among the variables, it provides no detail about 
the sanction-crime rate relationship, and it provides no possibility of 
"assessing the adequacy of a predictive model" (1971: 280). Bean and 
Cushing also include in their regression analyses a regional variable 
and a variable indicating the proportion of blacks in each state. They 
find support for the inclusion of a regional variable and write that 
"a reasonable hypothesis is that the etiological significance of region 
consists in the difference in the proportion black among state popula­
tions." (1971: 287) These studies, as well as that of Ehrlich, point 
to the usefulness of multiple regression analysis in the search for the 
determinants of homicide. But, as of yet, researchers have failed to 
either refine theoretical conceptions of deterrence or to isolate 
specific determinants of criminal behavior.
Several researchers also write that Ehrlich failed to include 
certain variables or included the wrong ones in the regression analyses, 
i.e., the regression equation had been misspecified (McGahey, 1980:
489). Klein et al. write that Ehrlich may have had different results if 
he had incorporated the effects of long prison sentences, actual length 
of incarceration, and the availability of handguns into his regression 
equation (1978: 346). In their reanalysis of Ehrlich’s data, these
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authors include an index to the general level of violent crime in their 
regression equation. They find that inclusion of this variable signifi­
cantly alters the finding of a deterrent effect (1978: 355). They write 
(1978: 356)
The coefficient of violent crime is very strong and statistically 
significant. . . .  the intercorrelation of violent crimes with 
homicide is so strong that it dominates the relationship to the 
extent of "crowding out" other effects.
They conclude that Ehrlich1s study does not consider the complex inter­
relationship among different types of crime and that no firm conclusions 
can be made about homicidal behavior —  its determinants or its possible 
deterrents (1978: 356).
In their assessment of Sellin1s and Ehrlich1s research, Baldus 
and Cole (1975: 170) write that Ehrlich failed to look at the migration 
rates between rural and urban areas, as well as handgun ownership and 
the overall level of violent crime. Other researchers in the late 
1970's have indicated that the following variables also may be important 
determinants of the homicide rate: poverty (Passell, 1975; Black and
Orsagh, 1978); racial migration (Passell, 1975); education; population 
density; percentage of state population living in metropolitan areas 
(Bailey, 1975); school enrollment rates; divorce rates; and regional 
residence (Forst, 1977). Few of these extralegal factors have been 
examined thoroughly in the empirical or theoretical literature on 
capital punishment and deterrence. Given these criticisms, serious 
doubt exists concerning the validity and reliability of Ehrlich's 
results. In fact, only Klein, Forst, and Filatov (1978) have been able 
to replicate Ehrlich's findings with his data up to rounding error.
Yet, they state (1978: 358)
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His arithmetic is correct; his formulation is imaginative; but 
application to the most serious of issues is premature. In 
short, we see too many plausible explanations for his finding a 
deterrent effect other than the theory that capital punishment 
deters murder.
Research on the Deterrent Efficacy of 
Capital Punishment and the Homicide 
of Law Enforcement Officers
The present research focuses on whether the statutory threat of 
capital punishment is a deterrent to the homicide of law enforcement 
officers. Sellin has focused research attention on the frequent argu­
ment that law enforcement officers are safer in those states that have 
the death penalty (1955, 1980). He writes (1980: 89) that "the police 
. . . regard the threat of execution that faces a potential murderer 
to be a powerful shield in protecting them in the exercise of their 
hazardous duties." The Supreme Court has, since the 1972 Furman decision, 
declared that guided discretionary statutes provide protection for both 
society and the accused offender. Guided discretionary laws dictate 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances to be considered in the sentenc­
ing of capital offenders. One aggravating circumstance is of concern in 
this study —  the killing of law enforcement officers.
Law enforcement officers often have supported the death penalty 
because they believe that they are safer. They also have lobbied to 
maintain this protection under guided discretionary statutes by the 
inclusion of this special provision in the list of aggravating circum­
stances. It is assumed that the inclusion of this provision offers them 
ever greater protection. For this reason, the present research not only 
examines the effect of the presence or absence of the death penalty, 
but includes the differences among states with a special provision for 
officers in the list of aggravating circumstances.
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There has been little research on the deterrent efficacy of the 
death penalty in regards to officers other than that by Sellin. After 
several different analyses, Sellin states that the "risk rates [for 
police] are generally lower in abolitionist states, except in the South" 
(1980) and concludes that "the belief of the police that in order to 
be safer in their occupation they need laws that threaten potential 
murderers with death has no factual basis." (1980: 100)
In the present study the major dependent variables are the 
UCR reported homicide and aggravated assault rates on law enforcement 
officers in the United States between 1975 and 1979. The use of the 
homicide data on officers may provide a more accurate and adequate test 
of the deterrence hypothesis than does a study that uses the UCR general 
homicide rate. First, the murder of an officer is usually defined as a 
capital offense, punishable by life imprisonment or the death penalty. 
Thus, police homicides are purely capital offenses. Second, it is 
assumed that these offenses are more accurately recorded and reported 
than other homicides. Thus the figures are highly reliable.
The data on aggravated assaults are used to test whether the 
presence of the death penalty actually exhibits a "generalizing" or 
"filtering" effect. It is hypothesized that those states that retain 
the death penalty will have lower rates of police kills and aggravated 
assaults on the police than those that have abolished the death penalty.
The independent variables were chosen primarily to replicate the 
choices made by other researchers in previous studies. These variables 
reflect a set of assumptions regarding the etiology of crime and focus 
on socioeconomic and demographic information. The specific variables 
and their operationalization are described in the following chapter.
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The methodology of the present research merges the contiguous 
states analyses used by Sellin with multiple regression analysis similar 
to that of Ehrlich. In this way, I test the validity of these different 
methodological approaches. Also, a comparison of the results with each 
other, as well as with the results of other researchers, provides some 
triangulation of methodologies. It is hoped that this research will 
provide direction for future studies as well as answer specific theoretic 
and methodological questions about the deterrent efficacy of capital 
punishment.
The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment:
Structuring Death Penalty Statutes
In 1967 the Supreme Court declared a moratorium on executions 
while the members examined both the constitutionality of the death penalty 
and the sentencing procedures in capital cases. This examination was 
part of a general trend in the Court and the Congress that had begun in 
the 1950s to create greater conformity and centralization of the state 
criminal codes, thus ensuring greater protection of citizens' basic civil 
rights (Reasons and Rich, 1978: 9). The moratorium on executions was 
also the final result of the declining use of the penalty throughout the 
1950s and 1960s. Bowers writes (1974: 28-29) that the decline in execu­
tions was related to several changes in the United States during these 
years. First was the growing awareness of the general public regarding 
the discriminatory use of the death penalty. This awareness created less 
willingness among citizens to support the penalty or to impose it when 
sitting as jurors on capital cases. Second, the federal courts became 
more receptive to hearing capital cases on appeal. Third, lawyers became 
more concerned with protecting the basic rights of criminal defendants.
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Fourth, influential authorities and officials within the states became 
increasingly reluctant to follow through with the execution of the 
penalty (Bowers, 1974: 29). In addition, other groups, specifically the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, lobbied extensively for the discontinuation 
of the death penalty and devoted a large effort to studies into the 
discriminatory nature of its use (Bowers, 1974: 19).
The Supreme Court has handed down several major decisions on 
capital punishment since the 1967 moratorium. The Court, during the 
years 1967 to 1972, made several decisions, some of which were to be 
altered by the 1971 Furman ruling. First, the Justices declared death 
qualification of jurors, that is, striking citizens from the jury because 
they would not support a death sentence, to be unconstitutional because 
the practice denied the defendants in capital cases juries representative 
of the community (Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 1968). Also, 
in 1968 and 1969 the Court returned two cases to the lower courts for 
procedural violations in sentencing. In the case of Boykin v . Alabama 
(395 U.S. 238, 1969) the defendant appealed his death sentence on a rob­
bery conviction arguing that the sentence was disproportionate to the 
offense. The defendant in the appeal of Maxwell v. Bishop (398 U.S. 292, 
1970) charged that standardless discretion in sentencing, as well as the 
finding of guilt and imposition of sentence in one hearing, resulted in 
discriminatory and arbitrary infliction of the death penalty. The Court 
evaded these constitutionality issues in both cases, reviewing instead 
the procedural issues of the sentencing process. Moreover, the Court 
declared in McGautha v. California (402 U.S. 183, 1971) that standards 
or guidelines were not required in capital sentencing decisions.
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Then in 1972, the Court ruled in Furman v. Georgia (408 U.S. 238, 
1972) that although the death penalty per se was not unconstitutional, 
its "imposition and carrying out . . . constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment." Again, the Court had not examined the constitutionality of 
the death penalty but had ruled on procedural issues. But in reversing 
the death sentence in Furman, the Court had automatically reduced to 
life imprisonment the death sentences of approximately 600 persons 
awaiting execution on death rows around the country (Dike, 1981: 305).
The decision in Furman was by no means unanimous. It was, in 
fact, a slim 5-4 majority and each member of the Court filed a separate 
opinion (Dike, 1981; White, 1976). Only two of the five Justices in the 
majority, Brennan and Marshall, declared that the death penalty was cruel 
and unusual punishment under any circumstances. The other three in the 
majority —  Stewart, White, and Douglas —  cited procedural violations in 
sentencing as causes for their opinions. Justice Douglas focused on the 
discriminatory nature of the use of the death penalty, while Justices 
Stewart and White declared that the arbitrariness of the sentences and 
the rarity of execution were causes for the reversal of the sentences of 
those awaiting death (White, 1976: 8). In addition, Justice White wrote 
that the purpose of the penalty was to deter others but that because of 
the rarity of its imposition it "made small contribution to deterring 
those crimes for which it may be enacted" (Dike, 1981: 303).
The majority decision provided the states with two options regard­
ing the structure of statutes on sentencing procedures in capital cases 
(Dike, 1981: 305; White, 1976: 4). Since all the pre-Furman capital 
statutes were nullified, the state legislatures were now faced with 
redrafting their capital statutes to conform to the Court’s decision.
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The first option for states choosing to reinstate the death penalty 
was mandatory sentencing. Mandatory sentencing procedures eliminated 
sentencing discretion by requiring an automatic death sentence when an 
individual was convicted of one of a set of narrowly defined capital 
offenses. The second option for the structure of capital statutes was 
"guided discretion" sentencing. This type of sentencing gave greater 
discretionary power to juries sub structured this discretion by requir­
ing that they consider specifically defined aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances pertaining to the offense. Dike writes (1981: 307):
By making explicit the factors aggravating the seriousness of the 
offense, the state presumably made it clear why certain defendants 
committing a given crime might merit the death penalty; by allow­
ing consideration of factors in mitigation, they presumably 
allowed true individualization of sentencing.
The mandatory sentencing laws reflected a return to classical 
rationales for punishment. Theorists of the Enlightenment era 
believed in both retribution and deterrence through punishment. Both 
of these goals could only be achieved through swift, severe, and certain 
punishment as would be dictated through mandatory sentences. But, the 
Court was also using the ideas of neoclassical theorists when allowing 
for standardized discretion of sentencing power. The neoclassists’ 
focus on the offender had led to a greater concern for reformation and 
rehabilitation, hence they advocated greater flexibility in sentencing. 
The merging of these two schools of thought in the Court’s Furman ruling 
was to be reconsidered in later decisions.
The Supreme Court in 1976 again examined the constitutionality 
of state capital punishment statutes in the appeals of five companion 
cases (Gregg v. Georgia, Proffitt v. Florida, Jurek v. Texas, Woodson
v. North Carolina, Roberts v. Louisiana) . The Court upheld the
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constitutionality of the statutes in the first three cases (Gregg, 
Proffitt, and Jurek). These states had provided the juries with lists 
of aggravating and mitigating factors to be considered. These states 
had also used a bifurcated trial process. The Court held, in contrast 
to the 1968 Witherspoon decision, that the separation of the finding of 
guilt and sentencing ensured that "the determination of guilt would not 
be tinged by the considerations of punishment" (Dike, 1981: 308). The 
statutes in the last two cases (Woodson, Roberts) were declared uncon­
stitutional because mandatory sentencing procedures allowed no consid­
eration of mitigating circumstances. Hence those states with mandatory 
capital sentencing statutes were required again to alter their legis­
lation.
In several other cases the Court has declared unconstitutional 
those statutes that do not allow the jury’s discretion for the considera­
tion of almost all mitigating factors (see Lockett v. Ohio, Roberts v. 
Louisiana). Consequently, most states have revised their statutes to 
comply with guided discretionary standards with optional consideration 
of additional factors of mitigation. An example of a typical capital 
statute with lists of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is 
presented in Appendix B.
The present research involved an examination of all the United 
States criminal codes to determine the presence or absence of the death 
penalty. Although another source was used to verify whether the penalty 
was authorized (see the following chapter on the research methodology), 
the review of the statutes proved to be an interesting secondary investi­
gation.
IV.
METHODOLOGY
Introduction
The present research addresses several theoretical and methodo­
logical questions. First, the research investigates whether the statutory 
presence of the death penalty affects the homicide rate of police officers. 
The deterrence doctrine is often stated in such a manner: an increase in
the severity of the punishment for an offense will result in the lowering 
of the rate of that offense. Hence, I am hypothesizing that those states 
retaining the death penalty for the years 1975 to 1979 will have fewer 
police homicides.
The second question concerns the effect of the statutory presence 
of the death penalty on lesser crimes, specifically firearm assaults.
Most often police officers are killed by some sort of firearm. It may 
be that severe penalties for police homicide "filter" to lesser offenses, 
particularly firearm assaults. Thus, the presence of the death penalty 
may reduce the number of firearm assaults on officers. Specifically,
I hypothesize that for the years 1975-1979 death penalty states will 
have lower rates of firearm assaults on police officers than will those 
states that have abolished capital punishment.
The third area of investigation concerns the applicability and 
validity of two specific methodologies in the study of the deterrent 
effect of capital punishment. The two methodologies used in the analyses
42
43
of the data are (1) a comparison of police homicide and firearm assault 
rates in contiguous abolition and retention states, and (2) the appli­
cation of multivariate regression techniques to measure the impact of 
specific legal and sociodemographic variables on the homicide and 
firearm assault rates. By comparing the results of these two methodol­
ogies, I hope to assess both the validity of present and previous 
investigations of the deterrent effect of capital punishment and the 
general applicability of these methodologies in the study of deterrence.
This chapter describes the dependent and independent variables 
of the study and the sources of data used to construct these variables. 
The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), Version 8 was used 
to complete the present analyses. The complete data file and code book 
are presented in Appendix A.
Dependent Variables 
Homicide Rate
The major dependent variable of the present study was the aggre­
gate rate of law enforcement officers killed during the years 1975-1979. 
Data on the number of law enforcement officers killed during the years
of this study, 1975-1979, were obtained' from the UCR annual publication
1
entitled Law Enforcement Officers Killed (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Department of Justice; FBI Uniform Crime Reports, 1975-1979.
The UCR obtains information on police homicides from two sources. 
First, preliminary information on the homicides is received by the UCR 
from the local law enforcement agencies. Second, the FBI field office 
then solicits more detailed information on the homicides from the report­
ing agencies. In addition, police homicides in the country or any United
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States territory are also reported by FBI field offices and legal attache 
offices. The data in these reports are considered to be valid and reli­
able according to the FBI (Law Enforcement Officers Killed, 1979: 2).
Each annual publication details the situations in which the 
officers were killed; the state and the locality; the type of weapon 
used; the location of the fatal wounds; the distance between the victim 
officer and offender; the month, the day, and the hour of the homicide; 
and other information pertaining to the specific incidents. The total 
number of law enforcement officers killed in each state for the years 
1975-1979 was coded from each of the annual publications.
The aggregate homicide rate for each state was constructed as:
Homicide _ Total Number of Police Homicides, 1975-1979 
Rate (Full-Time State Police Per 1,000 Population) *
x (Total State Population in 1,000*s)
The variables in the denominator are described in greater detail in a 
following section. The rate resulting from this computation represents 
the number of law enforcement officers killed in each state per 100,000 
officers 1975-1979. The numerator is multipled by 100,000 to standard­
ize the scores to a whole number.
The 1980 Law Enforcement Officers Killed was received after 
the data analysis had been completed, but this particular publication 
contained aggregate information on police officers killed for the years 
1971-1980. The data presented provide information concerning the 
circumstances, weapons, and assailants in these incidents. All of the 
following information was extracted from the 1980 publication.
The FBI reports that 1,147 officers were killed between 1971 and 
1980 and 94% of these officers were killed with some type of firearm.
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The FBI lists eleven categories of circumstances in which the officers 
were killed. More than three-fourths of the deaths occurred in one 
of the following five circumstances (listed in descending order of 
frequency): attempting arrests other than those for robbery; during
robberies in progress or pursuing robbery suspects; in response to 
disturbance calls; during traffic pursuits and stops; and when investi­
gating suspicious persons and circumstances (Law Enforcement Officers 
Killed 1980: 22). In addition, approximately 38% of the officers killed 
were on patrol alone at the time of the fatal incident.
Concerning the assailants in these incidents, 1,626 persons were 
identified in connection with the 1,147 murders. Ninety-six percent of 
the assailants were male, 51% were white, and 63% were between the ages 
of 18 and 30. These characteristics are similar to those reported in 
other studies that link persons of certain age, sex, and race categories 
to violent crimes. The violent offender is typically depicted as young, 
black, and male (Reid, 1975: 56-61). The FBI-identified characteristics 
of assailants are similar except that about half of the murderers of 
officers are white; often the number of black assailants is higher in 
other types of homicides.
The FBI has also tabulated the size of the victim officers’ 
agencies. Table 1 was constructed from data in the 1978, 1979 and 1980 
publications. The data indicate that most of the officers killed were 
based in cities larger than 250,000; then, in descending order: sub­
urban counties, state agencies, rural counties, and cities under 10,000. 
Approximately 85% of the police killed were employed in one of these 
areas. It is surprising that more of the victim officers were not based 
in cities in the population categories between 25,000 to 250,000, since
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higher levels of violent crime are assumed to occur in more densely 
populated areas.
TABLE 1
SIZE OF VICTIM OFFICER’J 
UNITED STATES, 1978-
3 AGENCIES, 
-1980
Population Group or 
Victim Officer's Agency
1978-1980
Total
Group I
Cities over 250,000
66
Group II
100,000 to 250,000
19
Group III 
50,000 to 100,000
14
Group IV
25,000 to 50,000
8
Group V
10,000 to 25,000
20
Group VI 
Under 10,000
34
Rural Counties 35
Suburban Counties 43
State Agencies 41
Other U.S. Related 
Territories
16
Federal Agencies 7
TOTAL 303
Additional factors of interest concern the places and times of 
the murderous acts. Specifically, officers are killed most frequently 
in Southern states (46% of the 10-year total) followed by the north 
central (20%), western (16%), and northeastern (14%) states. Officers
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are at greatest risk at night, particularly between 11 and 12 P.M., on 
Thursdays, and during the month of December according to the FBI reports.
In addition to these data, each annual publication also includes 
a narrative describing the circumstances surrounding each homicide. 
Although these descriptive narratives were not formally included in 
the data analysis, they were carefully read to provide a better under­
standing of the types of situations in which the officers were killed.
An example of the narratives is provided in Appendix B.
Firearm Assault Rate
The other dependent variable of the present study was the state 
firearm assault rate on police officers. This dependent variable is 
included in the analysis to test for a generalizing deterrent effect 
of capital punishment on lesser crimes. As mentioned previously, most 
officers are killed by firearms. In the last few decades, improvements 
in medical technology have increased one's probability of surviving 
a violent assault. That is, many people today are saved from death 
because medical facilities and techniques can more competently cope with 
such emergencies. Consequently, fewer firearm assaults result in death. 
Yet this fact does not lessen the seriousness of such assaults. In many 
cases, the intent of the assailant may be the murder of an officer.
Assault data were obtained through the UCR. The annual UCR does 
not provide detailed information on assaults on law enforcement officers 
so I requested this information by telephone from the UCR. I subse­
quently received a computer printout of the state law enforcement 
officer assault data for 1975 through 1979 and an example of the record­
ing sheet that is completed by each reporting agency. Examples of these 
data are given in Appendix B.
48
The assault data are presented by state and contain information
concerning the state population, the number of sworn officers, the 
number of agencies reporting, the type of activity to which the officers 
were responding when they were assaulted, the weapon used, the type of 
patrol assignment (e.g., two-man vehicle), the number of the assaults 
cleared by arrest, the time of the assault, the rates of personal injury 
incurred as a result of the assault, and the number of officers killed 
by felonious act, by negligence, or by accident. The latter informa­
tion, number killed by felonious act, negligence, or accident, is not 
considered to be reliable according to the UCR division; nor is the 
information concerning the time of the assault (Kendell, 1981: telephone 
conversation).
by the UCR was the following information: the total number of sworn
officers in the state for each of the years 1975-1979, the total number 
of reported assaults on officers in the state for each of the years 
1975-1979, and the total number of reported firearm assaults on officers 
in the state for each of the years 1971-1979.
differently from the homicide rate. Specifically, the rate was con­
structed for each year as:
Also coded for each year and each state from the data provided
The firearm assault rate for each state was computed somewhat
Rate of
Firearm Assaults 
on Officers (Year)
Number of Firearm Assaults
Total Number of
Reported Officers (Year)
Table 2 presents the firearm assault rates as they were com­
puted by SPSS. This table presents some striking and confusing results.
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Specifically, the rates fluctuate widely from year to year in most of 
the states. For example, the firearm assault rate in Alaska rises from 
1,180 in 1975 to 2,024 in 1976. By 1978, the rate has declined to 
796. Several other states also exhibit this same pattern (see Alabama, 
Colorado, Nevada, Utah, etc.). After carefully examining these results, 
I returned to the original data to determine whether these fluctuations 
were the result of coding errors. It appears that these fluctuations 
are primarily the result of reporting practices within each state, 
specifically the reporting of the number of sworn officers in the state. 
For example, the fluctuation in the Alaska firearm assault rate is most 
likely the result of the pattern of increasing and decreasing numbers of 
reported officers. The printout shows the number of officers for the 
years 1975 to 1979 to be: 339, 247, 192, 377, 399. It is unknown if
these fluctuations reflect actual changes in the number of sworn offi­
cers, but it is presumed that they are more likely to be reflective of 
reporting practices, not actual changes in police coverage. The firearm 
assault data were aggregated for the five year period and measures of 
variability were included in the analyses to reduce the impact of these 
fluctuations. The measures of variability provided for identification 
of those states that had wide fluctuations in their rates and allowed 
the elimination of those states in which the rates were considered to 
be unreliable.
Sanction (Deterrence) Variables 
The sanction variable has usually been constructed as the total 
number of some type of sanction (arrest, conviction, or sentence) as a 
proportion of the total number of reported crimes. As mentioned in
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Chapter II, a correlation of ratios with common terms often results from 
an equation with the sanction variable and the crime rate because both 
ratios contain an indicator of the total number of reported crimes. The 
present study avoided this frequent problem of deterrence research by 
focusing only on the presence or absence of capital punishment statutes. 
It is the threat of punishment that is purported to deter indi­
viduals from commission of a crime. The inclusion of such a variable 
indicating only the legal status of the death penalty in each state was 
appropriate. Again, it is assumed that the threat of execution in 
retentionist states is greater than zero even though the number of 
executions during this period was small. Also incorporated into the 
analysis was a variable indicating whether the death penalty statutes 
included provisions for law enforcement officers.
There were several sources of data for these variables. First, 
the individual state criminal codes were examined to determine if the 
death penalty was authorized. Because these codes are often changed, 
particularly the capital punishment statutes of the last five or ten 
years, a second source of data was chosen to verify the information.
This second source was an annual report of the United States 
Department of Justice entitled Capital Punishment. This report is pub­
lished as part of the National Prisoner Statistics program (NPS). Each 
NPS Capital Punishment publication between 1975 and 1979 listed the 
status of the death penalty in each state and the District of Columbia. 
In the 1975 and 1976 Capital Punishment reports, the states were listed 
according to the "presence of capital punishment provisions," either 
pre- or post-Furman, or as having "no statutory provisions" for capital 
punishment (Capital Punishment 1975, Table 24: 56; Capital Punishment
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1976, Table 28: 60-61). Since these data were only of nominal level, 
they were coded as dummy variables for inclusion in the regression 
analyses. If no statutory provision for capital punishment was listed, 
the state was coded as "I"; all others were coded as blanks, i.e., zeros.
The charts in the Capital Punishment publications on the status 
of the death penalty were revised and the terminology was changed for 
the years 1977 to 1979. The states were now listed according to whether 
the death penalty was "authorized" or "not authorized" during that 
particular year (Capital Punishment 1977, Appendix 2: 88-90; Capital 
Punishment 1978, Appendix 1: 10-13; Capital Punishment 1979, Appendix 1: 
10-13). Again, those states in which the death penalty was not author­
ized were coded as "1" while all others were coded as blanks. The
information on the status of the death penalty is as of December 31 of
each year. In the regression analysis I distinguished abolition states
from death penalty jurisdictions. All states consistently coded as
a "1" on the five statutory variables were defined as a new variable 
indicating abolition of the death penalty. All the retention states 
were consistently coded as blanks.
Another source of data for the present study was the individual 
state statutes defining capital murder and the punishment of convicted 
offenders. The criminal codes of the fifty states and the District of 
Columbia were examined, not only for the presence or absence of the 
death penalty, but for the inclusion of a special provision for law 
enforcement officers. Those states without a provision were coded as 
blanks for this variable. Those with a provision regarding officers 
were coded as "1" if the provision was listed in the definition of 
capital murder or as a "2" if this provision was listed in the section
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concerning aggravating circumstances. To include these variables in 
subsequent regression analyses, it was necessary to distinguish those 
states with provisions for officers from those without. Again an "if" 
statement was used to generate a dummy variable. Those states coded 
as either "I" or "2" on the previous variable were now included in the 
analysis as a new variable. Also coded was: the year the statutes
were enacted and the publication year for the volume from which the 
information was obtained.
In addition, each volume of the individual state code is usually 
accompanied by a yearly update, or what is referred to as a "pocket 
supplement." These supplements list and detail any new legislation 
that may have occurred since the publication of the original volume.
For this study it was important that these supplements be thoroughly 
examined because statutory changes could have occurred between the 
time of publication of the original volume and the present. The state 
legislatures have often revised their statutes to meet the constitu­
tional requirements regarding capital punishment decided on by the 
Supreme Court. The structure of the capital statutes during these 
years was described in detail in Chapter III.
Sociodemographic Variables
The source of extralegal or sociodemographic data for the present 
research was the Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1979 (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, 1979). The selection of variables to include in 
the present analyses was based on the variables that had been used in 
previous deterrence studies. The selection of the sociodemographic 
variables reflected not only the choices made by previous researchers.
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Rather, these variables signify broad theoretical traditions within 
sociology regarding the etiology of crime. Several variables are 
indicators of economic status, such as state levels of unemployment 
and median income. Underlying the choice to include these variables is 
the assumption that economic factors influence crime. The inclusion of 
population variables, such as the size of the black population, rests 
on the assumption that race also may be a causal factor in criminality. 
Similarly, the variables that measure police coverage reflect assump­
tions that crime levels are affected by increases or decreases in the 
number of officers available.
The following list indicates the demographic information that 
was coded for each state from the Statistical Abstract. Also included 
is the table number and the page number. The reader is directed to this 
publication for details concerning the original sources of these data.
55
Sociodemographic Variables
State Aggravated Assault Rate, Per 100,000 Population. 1978. No. 293, 
p. 178.
State Resident Population Composed of Blacks from the Ages of 25 to 44, 
in Thousands. 1976. No. 31, p. 31.
State Resident Population Between the Ages of 25 and 44, in Thousands. 
1978. No. 30, p. 30.
State Median Family Income. 1975. No. 742, p. 453.
Percentage of State Resident Population of Males, 18-24 Years of Age, 
Who Have Graduated from High School. 1976. No. 325, p. 147.
Percentage of State Population Residing in Metropolitan Areas. 1977. 
No. 19, p. 19.
Rate of State Full-Time Police Officers Per 1,000 Population. 1977.
No. 315, p. 188.
Total Resident Population, in Thousands. 1978. No. 30, p. 30.
Percentage of State Resident Population Over Age 14 Residing in the 
State for Five Years or Less. 1976. No. 46, p. 39.
Unemployment Rate of Male Resident Population. 1978. No. 673, p. 406.
The following variables were included also:
State Resident Population Between the Ages of 
A 0 25 and 44, in Thousands. 1978.
ge omposi ion Total Resident Population, in Thousands. 1978.
State Resident Population Composed of Blacks 
Between the Ages 25 and 44, in Thousands. 1976.
Black Population = ^ - ' 1  Resident Population, in Thousands. 1978. (100)
V.
ANALYSES AND FINDINGS
Contiguous States Analysis
Selection of States
The first method of analysis was a contiguous state analysis
similar to that of Sellin, described earlier. During the years under 
study (1975 to 1979) many states were in the process of revising their 
death penalty statutes to conform to the guidelines handed down by the 
Supreme Court. Thus some states were not consistent retentionist or 
abolitionist for the entire period of the study. These states were 
eliminated from the contiguous states analysis for greater comparability 
among states. The states eliminated were identified from the consistent 
abolition or retention states by examination of the coding on the 
presence or absence of death penalty statutes. Those states coded as 
"I" on all five variables were abolition states; those coded as blanks 
on all five were retention states; all others were considered to be 
inconsistent abolitionist or retentionist jurisdictions and were elimi­
nated .
The twelve jurisdictions eliminated were:
Colorado
District of Columbia
Kansas
Maryland
Massachusetts
New Jersey
New Mexico
Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
South Dakota
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The nine states that were coded as consistent abolition states
were:
Alaska Minnesota
Hawaii North Dakota
Iowa West Virginia
Maine Wisconsin
Michigan
The remaining thirty states not in the previous two lists were 
death penalty states for the entire five-year period under study.
The following chart lists the abolitionist states and contiguous 
retentionist states used in the present analysis. Alaska and Hawaii are 
eliminated because they lack contiguous states -9 Minnesota because it had 
no contiguous retentionist state.
Abolition States Contiguous Retention States
(1) Iowa Illinois
Missouri
Nebraska
(2) Maine New Hampshire
(3) Michigan Indiana
(4) North Dakota Montana
(5) West Virginia Kentucky
Virginia
(6) Wisconsin Illinois
Firearm Assault Rates 
The first contiguous state analysis concerned the yearly firearm 
assault rate on police. The deterrence hypothesis implies that the 
death penalty may have a deterrent effect on lesser crimes, particularly 
on those offenses directly related to homicides. Specifically, it was
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hypothesized that those states with the death penalty would have fewer 
firearm assaults on law enforcement officers. Since most officers 
are killed with firearms, I examined firearm assaults for a test of 
a generalized deterrent effect.
The first step in this stage of the research was construction of 
firearm assault rates from data provided by the UCR (see Chapter IV).
As described in the data sources section, the firearm assault rates in 
many states fluctuated unpredictably over the five-year period. It was 
decided that to continue with a contiguous states analysis of these data 
it would be necessary to aggregate the firearm assault rates over the 
five years. I also decided to construct a measure of variability in 
order to determine which states experienced the greatest fluctuations 
in the yearly rates. Those states that were subject to substantial 
fluctuations would be eliminated from the contiguous states analysis.
The aggregate firearm assault rate was constructed as:
Average Firearm The Total Sum of Firearm Assault Rates (1975-1979) 
Assault Rate 5
To measure the variability of coverage, a slightly altered
version of the coefficient of variability was used (Variability = --- )
in which the mean deviation was substituted for . To construct this 
measure, it was first necessary to compute the denominator, i.e., 
average number of reported officers in a given state:
Mean Number _ Total Number of Officers, 1975-1979 
of Officers 5
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For the numerator, the mean deviation of the firearm assault rates was 
derived as follows:
« . |X - X orMean Deviation = — 1 ^----
1 Total Number of Officers (Year) - Mean Number of Officers |
5
Allowing the 5*s to cancel, these expressions were translated into a 
measure of stability of coverage as follows:
[ABS (Total Officers, 1975 - Mean Number of Officers)
+ ABS (Total Officers, 1976 - Mean Number of Officers) 
+ ABS (Total Number of Officers, 1977 - Mean Number of 
Mean Deviation Officers) + ABS (Total Number of Officers, 1978 - Mean
of Coverage Number of Officers) +  ABS (Total Number of Officers,
1979 ~ Mean Number of Officers)]_________________________
Total Number of Officers, 1975-1979
(ABS indicates the absolute values of the numbers given.)
Another compute format was also included to measure the level of 
degree of coverage. This computation was:
_ Mean Number of Officers .
overage (Rate of Full-Time Police Per 1,000)
(Total Population in 1,000's)
This computation balances the two reported measures of coverage —  the 
numerator represents the UCR reported coverage, while the denominator 
is an estimate of the total number of police as reported in the U.S. 
Statistical Abstract (1979).
Table 3 presents the data on these two variables, the mean 
deviation of coverage and coverage for the contiguous states under 
analysis. The condescriptive statistics for the total fifty-one 
jurisdictions are presented also. The mean scores for each variable 
were examined.
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I decided that any state with a variability score less than 
.15 would be considered to have a relatively stable firearm assault rate 
and those states would be included in the analysis. In addition, those 
states with a police coverage greater than or equal to 50% also would be 
included, because they would be more likely to accurately report firearm 
assaults on officers. Thus, these two measures were used to determine 
which states would be used in the contiguous state analysis.
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TABLE 3
CONTIGUOUS STATES: POLICE COVERAGE 
DEVIATIONS OF THE AVERAGE FIREARM 
RATE OF POLICE OFFICERS
AND MEAN 
ASSAULT
State COVERAGE (%) MEANDEV
Iowa (A) 53 .09
Illinois (R) 64 .06
Nebraska (R) 61 .06
Missouri (R) 49 .05
Maine (A) 58 .12
New Hampshire (R) 47 .22
Michigan (A) 58 .24
Indiana (R) 47 .14
North Dakota (A) 60 .17
Montana (R) 40 .09
West Virginia (A) 54 .06
Kentucky (R) 52 .04
Virginia (R) 63 .07
Wisconsin (A) 73 .05
Illinois (R) 64 .06
A = Abolitionist
R = Retentionist
MEAN DEVIATION COVERAGE
N = 51 N = 51
Mean = .144 Mean = 52.274
Variance = .008 Variance = 175. 655
Range = .32 Range = 80.012
Minimum = .022 Maximum = .344 Minimum = 11.163 Maximum = 91.175
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Several states were eliminated because the mean deviation was 
greater than .15 and/or the coverage was less than 50%. The states 
eliminated were:
(coverage = 49%)Missouri
New Hampshire (mean deviation = .22; coverage = 47%) 
Michigan 
Indiana 
Montana 
North Dakota
(mean deviation = .24) 
(coverage = 47%) 
(coverage = 40%)
(mean deviation = .17)
The elimination of these states substantially reduced the number 
and the size of the clusters to be used in this analysis; in fact, only 
three clusters remained. Table 4 presents the results of the analysis, 
given the restrictions listed in the previous paragraphs.
TABLE 4
CONTIGUOUS STATES: AVERAGE FIREARM
ASSAULT RATES OF POLICE OFFICERS
Rate Per
Cluster A or R 1,000 Officers
(1) Iowa (A) 479
Illinois (R) 489
Nebraska (R) 1607
(2) West Virginia (A) 358
Kentucky (R) 391
Virginia <R) 805
(3) Wisconsin (A) 413
Illinois (R) 489
A = Abolitionist 
R = Retentionist
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The results of this analysis are similar to those of Sellin in 
his studies of the deterrent effect of capital punishment. The aboli­
tion states in this analysis had consistently lower rates of firearm 
assaults on police. If a generalizing deterrent effect were operating, 
those states retaining the death penalty for homicide would have lower 
rates of firearm assaults. Thus, this analysis supports the null 
hypothesis that no generalizing deterrent effect results from the 
presence of death penalty statutes.
Homicide Rates
The contiguous states analysis of the aggregate homicide rates 
yields more ambiguous findings than did the previous analysis of the 
firearm assault rates. The results of this analysis are presented in 
Table 5.
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TABLE 5
CONTIGUOUS STATES: NUMBER AND RATE 
OF POLICE HOMICIDES 
1975 - 1979
Rate Per
Cluster 100,000 Number
Officers
(1) Iowa (A) 52 3
Illinois (R) 46 16
Nebraska (R) 110 15
Missouri (R) 91 3
(2) Maine (A) 44 1
New Hampshire (R) 50 1
(3) Michigan (A) 46 11
Indiana (R) 53 6
(4) North Dakota (A) 0 0
Montana (R) 53 1
(5) West Virginia (A) 411 13
Kentucky (R) 172 12
Virginia (R) 79 9
(6) Wisconsin (A) 68 8
Illinois (R) 46 16
A = Abolitionist 
R = Retentionist
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The first four clusters of contiguous states supports the null 
hypothesis. The death penalty states in these clusters had consistently 
higher police homicide rates. The sixth cluster, containing Wisconsin 
and Illinois, is in the direction indicated by the deterrence hypothesis. 
The abolition state in this cluster had a higher police homicide rate.
The fifth cluster also supported the deterrence hypothesis, but the 
extremely high homicide rate in West Virginia was notable. Was this 
high rate due only to the absence of the death penalty or were other 
factors responsible? It is impossible to answer this question from this 
type of analysis.
I returned to the original source of the data to find out more 
about the incidents in which the West Virginia officers were killed. 
Thirteen officers were killed in the five-year period, eleven during the 
first three years (1975-1977). It is unfortunate that no narratives of
I
these incidents are available for these years to indicate whether the 
circumstances were unusual and several officers were killed at one time. 
Three of four officers killed in 1976 were victims of a bomb. Such an 
incident could radically change the rate of officers killed. Thus, we 
cannot isolate specific explanations about the anomalous West Virginia 
data. Thus this analysis, on the whole, did not support the deterrence 
hypothesis. The data of all 6 clusters, taken together, supports 
the null hypothesis of no deterrence.
For the following discussion, multiple regression analysis was 
used to examine the effects of both the sanction and sociodemographic 
factors upon the homicide and firearm assault rates on officers.
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Multiple Regression Analyses 
The standard multivariate regression analyses of the present 
study were completed under the regression subroutine of SPSS, Version 8. 
The initial analyses were stepwise regressions of one of the dependent 
variables, either the aggregate homicide or firearm assault rate, on 
the sociodemographic variables described previously. The results of 
these initial regressions were examined and the variables with signifi­
cant regression coefficients were included in subsequent regressions.
The two sanction variables, indicating abolition or retention 
and the presence of a provision for officers, were included in the next 
analysis. The stepwise inclusion of these dummy variables, after the 
identification of significant demographic factors, would indicate 
whether the presence of capital punishment had a significant net impact 
on the dependent variable. The matrix of zero-order correlations of the 
independent and dependent variables are presented in Appendix C.
The reader should note that in the original data, Washington, 
D.C. had missing values on the general aggravated assault and median 
income variables. For this reason Washington, D.C. was eliminated from 
calculations using those variables.
The following sections detail the results of the regression 
analyses. The first section describes the findings of the regressions 
of the aggregate firearm assault rate on the sociodemographic and 
sanction variables. The second section describes similar regressions 
with the aggregate homicide rate as the dependent variable.
Firearm Assault Rate 
The first analysis regressed the average firearm assault rate on
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the eight sociodemographic variables listed previously. Those variables 
having a significant impact on the firearm assault rate were identified 
through the regression. The results of this analysis are presented in 
Table 6. These eight variables accounted for 53% of the variance in 
the dependent variable. But only two variables, the general aggravated 
assault rate and black population, were significant predictors of the 
average firearm assault rates in the final regression equation. These 
two variables accounted for approximately 41% of the overall variance.
The individual steps of the regression were examined also. It 
appeared that some of the independent variables lost their predictive 
power with the inclusion of subsequent variables. I decided to find 
the regression equation on the stepwise procedures in which the greatest 
number of the variables had significant regression coefficients. The 
best equation for predicting the firearm assault rate from the first 
analysis included three variables: the general aggravated assault rate,
the percent black population, and income levels. Approximately 48% of 
the variance in the dependent variable was explained by these three 
variables. (See equation at Table 7 below.)
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TABLE 6
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS: AVERAGE FIREARM ASSAULT
RATE AND SELECTED SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
Independent
Variables___________ r____________ B___________ BETA___________ F
AGECOMP -.003 79.888 .158 1.014
AGGASSLT .550 4.589 .748 26.895**
BLACKPOP .015 -95.122 -.456 6.169**
INCOME -.198 - .096 -.320 1.014
MALEHS -.148 - 3.045 -.030 .038
METRO -.093 - 1.894 -.074 .254
RESID .312 12.154 .139 1.066
UNEMP -.119 -29.644 -.081 .249
**Significant at .05 (F >_ 4.08) R^ = .532
Constant = -190.377
The next phase of the analysis was to calculate the regression 
of the average firearm assault rates on these three variables and to 
include the sanction variables. If the presence of capital punishment, 
as well as provisions for police, were deterrents to firearm assaults 
on officers, these variables would contribute significantly to the 
explained variance in the dependent variable.
The results of this regression, presented in Table 7, indicate 
that neither of the sanction variables was a significant predictor of 
the average firearm assault rate. These findings do not support the 
hypothesis that the death penalty is a deterrent to homicide-related
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offenses. These results corroborate the contiguous states analyses of 
firearm assaults presented in the previous section. Thus, using only 
the three significant variables, the best predictive regression equation 
w as:
Assault Rate3™  = 381.926 + 4.856 (General Aggravated Assault Rate)
- 97.715 (Percent of Population
Composed of Blacks)
- .087 (Median Income)
TABLE 7
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS: AVERAGE FIREARM 
RATE ON AGGASSLT, BLACKPOP, INCOME, 
LEOPROV, AND ABOLISH
ASSAULT
Independent
Variables r B BETA F
AGGASSLT .550 4.917 .802 34.292**
BLACKPOP .015 -101.718 -.488 13.510**
INCOME -.198 -.093 -.307 6.734**
LEOPROV .150 -149.934 -.113 .688
ABOLISH -.171 -96.602 -.057 .153
**Significant at .05 (F 4.08) R2 = .493
Constant = 1573.196
The regression coefficients for the aggravated assault variable 
suggest that as the rate of these assaults in the general population 
increases, so does the rate of firearm assaults on the resident officers. 
As such, this variable may be an indicator of the general level of 
violence occurring in the population.
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The second most significant predictor of the average firearm 
assault rates, holding constant the rate of aggravated assaults and 
income levels, was the percentage of blacks between the ages of 24 and
44. But surprisingly, the direction of the coefficient is negative 
rather than positive. These data suggest that increases in this specific 
population group were associated with fewer firearm assaults on police 
officers. This result is contradictory to the general finding that 
increases in the black population, particularly young blacks, are 
associated with higher levels of violent personal crime. But these 
results compare favorably to those reported by the FBI concerning the 
assailants in police murders (see Chapter IV). About half of the offi­
cers killed during a ten-year period were murdered by white assailants.
As mentioned previously, the proportion of black assailants is generally 
greater for other types of homicides.
There are several other possible explanations for this negative 
beta weight. It could be that police coverage and patroling are less 
in areas with a high concentration of black residents. The styles of 
police patroling also may vary by neighborhood, thus blacks are exposed 
to fewer opportunities to assault an officer. Also, the majority of 
patrol officers in black neighborhoods might be black and thus less apt 
to be the victims of violence. Another possible explanation might be 
that much of the violence in black areas is directed internally, i.e., 
both the victims and assailants reside in the area where the incidents 
occur with little of such behavior directed towards an "outsider."
The third variable of significance was median income. The 
regression coefficient indicates that as median family income increases, 
the firearm assault rate on officers decreases. That is, higher income
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levels appear to be an inhibitor for this offense. But as described 
earlier, this variable achieved significance only when the subsequent 
explanatory variables were dropped from the stepwise regression equation. 
It may be that the influence of these other factors were included in the 
finding. In other words, there may have been some interaction with 
other independent variables.
Homicide Rate
The second dependent variable to be examined was the aggregate 
homicide rate of law enforcement officers, 1975 to 1979, in each state. 
The format of the regression analyses was similar to that for the 
firearm assault rate. The homicide rate was regressed first on eight 
sociodemographic variables. The results of this initial regression are 
presented in Table 8 below.
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TABLE 8
MULTIPLE
1975-1979
REGRESSION ANALYSIS: POLICE HOMICIDE RATE 
AND SELECTED SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
Independent
Variables r B BETA F
AGECOMP -.029 3.974 .085 .092
AGGASSLT .182 .087 .111 .480
BLACKPOP .141 -6.044 -.227 1.241
INCOME -.354 - .008 -.199 .559
MALEHS -.523 -7.008 -.549 10.050**
METRO -.259 - .652 -.199 1.503
RESID .155 1.952 .176 1.371
UNEMP -.014 -3.359 .052 .224
**Significant at .05 (F _> 4.08) R2 = .421
Constant = -654.0583
The regression equation with these eight independent variables 
accounts for approximately 42% of the variance in the dependent variable. 
But only one variable, indicating the percentage of males with high 
school degrees, had a significant regression coefficient in this equa­
tion. This variable accounted for 27% of the variance in the observed 
homicide rates. Again, the individual steps in the regression analysis 
were examined to find the equation in which several variables maintained 
significant regression coefficients. This equation was found on the 
second step of the regression. Two independent variables, the percent­
age of males graduating from high school and the percentage of the
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population residing in metropolitan areas, were the best predictors of 
the homicide rate. They accounted for 36% of the variance in the homi­
cide rates. The best regression equation from the initial analysis was:
Homicide Rate = 696.014 - 6.864 (Male High School Graduates)
- .940 (Percent Metropolitan Population)
The next analysis regressed the homicide rate on these two vari­
ables and the sanction variables. If the presence of the death penalty 
and a special provision for officers were deterrents to the homicide of 
police, the sanction variables would contribute significantly to the 
total variance in the homicide rates. The results of this regression 
are presented in Table 9.
TABLE 9
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS: POLICE HOMICIDE RATE
AND MALEHS, METRO, LEOPROV, AND ABOLISH
Independent
Variables r B BETA F
MALEHS .523 - 7.175 -.563 21 .511**
METRO .259 - .769 -.235 3 .399
ABOLISH .025 42.083 .196 1.546
LEOPROV .163 17.838 .105 .446
**Significant at .05 (F > 4.08) R2 = .37
Constant = 691.593
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Again it appears that the sanction variables do not contribute 
significantly to the explained variance in the homicide rates. Also, 
only the variable indicating male high school graduates remained as a 
significant predictor of the homicide rate. The regression of the homi­
cide rate on the only significant variable resulted in the following 
equation predicting the dependent variable:
Homicide Rate = 625.161 - 6.673 (Percent Male High School Graduates)
The B value of this predictor indicates that an increase in the per­
centage of males graduating from high school was associated with a 
decrease in the homicide rate of police officers. Examination of the 
residuals revealed that the two states, Nevada and West Virginia, were 
deviant cases. These two "outliers" were removed from the equation and 
the regression completed again. The best equation predicting the homi­
cide rate when these deviant cases were removed was:
Homicide Rate = 571.956 - 6.115 (Percent of Male High School Graduates)
Conclusion
This study was an investigation of the deterrent efficacy of 
capital punishment statutes on the homicide of law enforcement officers. 
Also investigated was the deterrent effect of these statutes on the 
firearm assaults of officers. Two methods of analysis were used: a
contiguous states methodology and multiple regression analysis. Both 
types of analyses resulted in findings similar to that of previous 
deterrence research. Police officers contend that they are safer in 
death penalty states because individuals are deterred by their fear of 
harsh sanctioning. The research presented here generally disputes such
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a claim. The data yielded little evidence that capital punishment 
statutes exerted a deterrent effect on either the police homicide or 
firearm assault rates during the period under study.
The contiguous states analysis of the police firearm assault 
rates indicated that capital punishment statutes did not result in fewer 
assaults. Rather the abolition states had consistently lower rates.
The regression analyses corroborated these findings. Sociodemographic 
variables included in the regression equation accounted for a greater 
proportion of the variance in the firearm assault rate than did the 
sanction variables.
The contiguous states analysis of the police homicide rates 
generally did not allow rejection of the null hypothesis of no deter­
rence. But two of the six clusters of contiguous states contained 
abolition states in which the homicide rates were higher than contiguous 
death penalty states. The regression analyses also did not lead to 
rejection of the null hypothesis. Again sociodemographic factors 
appeared to be more important determinants of the police homicide rate 
than did the presence or absence of the death penalty. The inclusion 
of a provision for officers in the capital punishment statutes did not 
increase their safety from either firearm assaults or homicide.
Weaknesses and Strengths 
of the Present Study
The validity of the present research findings are hampered by a 
few considerations. As mentioned throughout the text, the assault data 
were subject to fluctuations in reporting. These fluctuations were 
taken into account in the contiguous states analysis, but not in the 
regression analyses. The removal of several states from the regression
76
analyses also would have jeopardized the validity of the findings, so 
all of the states remained in these analyses.
Several variables were not included in the regression analyses. 
It may be that inclusion of these variables would have altered the 
findings. Specifically, no indicator of the rate of gun ownership was 
included, nor was the general homicide rate of the population. Future 
researchers might include these variables if they attempt to replicate 
or expand this research endeavor.
The strengths of the present study are particularly important 
and balance the weaknesses described above. First, this study concerned 
an investigation of the deterrent effect of capital punishment statutes 
on a particular capital crime. Earlier studies, other than that by 
Sellin, generally have not isolated a capital offense but have used the 
general homicide rate. Second, the present study also has attempted to 
address questions concerning the filtering deterrent effect of capital 
punishment on crimes related to homicide. Third, the construction of 
the sanction variables eliminated the frequent problem in deterrence 
research of correlation of ratios with common terms in the regression 
analyses.
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APPENDIX A 
Codebook and Data File
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CODEBOOK
BACKGROUND DATA CARD 1
1. State NAME1 (variable name capitalized)
2. Per cent METROpolitan
Column(s) (right justify) 
(do not code 
decimal points)
1-2
3-5 
(X = blank)
(100.0 « 99.9)
3. State POPulation (1,000s), 1978 6-10
4. Age COMposition (25-44) (1,000s), 1978 11-14
5. BLACK Population (25-44) (1,000s), 1976 15-17
6. Per cent RESIDing 5 Years or Less, 1976 18-20
7. Per cent MALEHS Grad. (18-24), 1976 21-23
8. State AGGASSLT Rate, 1978 24-26
9. POLICE per 1,000 Population, 1977 27-28
10. Male UNEMPloyment Rate, 1978 29-31
11. Median Family INCOME, 1975 32-36
DELICT DATA CARDS 2 through 6
12. State NAME2 1-2
13. Number 0FFICER5, 1975 3-7
14. Total ASSAULT5 (row 12), 1975 8-11
15. Total FIREARM5, 1975 12-14
16. Number CLEARED5 (row 12), 1975 15-18
17. Total H0MIC5, 1975 19-20
(Continue with CARD 3; use 0FFICER6, etc.)
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SANCTION DATA CARD 7 Column(s)
42. State NAME 7 1-2
43. StatelDNUMBER 3-4
44. N0STAT5: No statutory provision 5
for c.p. in 1975 NPS report
45. N0STAT6: No statutory provision 6
for c.p. in 1976 NPS report
46. N0NAUTH7: D.p. not authorized 7
as of 12/31/77
47. N0NAUTH8: D.p. not authorized 8
as of 12/31/78
48. N0NAUTH9: D.p. not authorized 9
as of 12/31/79
49. LEO provision 10
50. YEAR of enactment of section 11-12 
containing LEO provision
51. CODEDATE: Publication date 13-14 
of state criminal code source)
15-16
17-18
52. RECD75: Total prisoners received
under sentence of death, 1975
53. RECD76: Total prisoners received
under sentence of death, 1976
54. RECD77: Total prisoners received
under sentence of death, 1977
55. RECD78: Total prisoners received
under sentence of death, 1978
56. RECD79: Total prisoners received
under sentence of death, 1979
19-20
21-22
23-24
(right justify) 
(do not code 
decimal points)
(1 = no stat. prov.) 
blank = other)
(1 = no stat. prov.) 
blank = other)
(1 = no auth.) 
blank = other)
(1 = no auth.) 
blank = other)
(1 = no auth. 
blank = other)
(1 = definitional 
2 = aggravating 
circumstances 
list only 
blank = no LEO
provision)
(blank = NA or 
inapplicable)
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KENTUCKY PENAL CODE
C H A P T E R  507 
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE
507.020. Murder. —  (1) A  person is guilty of murder when:
(a) With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death 
of such person or of a third person; except that in any prosecution a person 
shall not be guilty under this subsection if he acted under the influence of 
extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explana­
tion or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the 
viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances 
as the defendant believed them to be. However, nothing contained in this 
section shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for or preclude a convic­
tion of manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime; or
(b) Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human 
life, he wantonly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to 
another person and thereby causes the death of another person.
(2) Murder is. a Class A  felony, except that in the following situations 
it is a(capital offense: 3
(a) The defendant’s act of killing was intentional and was for profit or 
hire;
(b) The defendant’s act of killing was intentional, and occurred during 
the commission of arson in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, 
burglary in the first degree, or rape in the first degree;
(c) The defendant’s act of killing was intentional and the defendant was 
a prisoner and the victim was a prison employe engaged at the time of the 
act in the performance of his duties;
(d) The defendant’s act of killing was intentional and the death was 
caused through use of a destructive device, as defined in K R S  237.030(1);
(e) The defendant’s act or acts of killing were intentional and resulted 
in multiple death; or
(f) The defendant’s act of killing was intentional and the victim was a 
police officer, sheriff or deputy sheriff engaged at the time of the act in the 
lawful performance of his duties. (Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 406, § 61.)
Cross-References. Corroboration of confes- Felony, conviction for excludes one from  
sion, RCr 9.60. suffrage, Const., § 145.
Felonies and misdemeanors, KRS 431.060. "Sweating" prohibited, KRS 422.110.
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SUMMARIES OF INCIDENTS, 1979
The following summaries are based on information 
received from local, county, state, and Federal law enforcement 
agencies in the United States, Puerto Rico, and Guam.
JANUARY
Georgia
An investigator with the Richmond County, Georgia, 
Sheriff's Department died as a result of chest wounds received 
while he was sitting in his patrol car. The 37-year-old 
victim had stopped a car driven by a burglary suspect.
However, before the officer could exit his vehicle to question 
the subject, who was known to him, the 30-year-old man 
allegedly fired at him with a .30-30-caliber rifle. The 
assailant fled the scene unwounded although the victim, an 
11-year veteran, returned fire with his .38-caliber service 
weapon. Subsequently, pursuing officers engaged in a high­
speed chase and gun battle with the subject, who was then 
arrested and charged with murder.
Maryland
After responding to a silent burglary alarm at a 
local discount store, an Assistant Chief Deputy assigned to 
canine duty with the Garrett County, Maryland, Sheriff's 
Department was shot and killed. Investigation indicates that 
upon arrival at the scene, the 31-year-old officer apprehended 
one suspect and encountered a second. A struggle apparently 
ensued between the second suspect and the victim, during 
which the suspect was wounded and the deputy was shot seven 
times with a 9-millimeter handgun. The 30- and 32-year-old 
assailants reportedly killed the officer's dog and then 
escaped in the police cruiser. After the offenders wrecked 
the vehicle, they allegedly entered a private residence, 
bound the occupants, and stole their personal automobile. 
Following a high-speed chase, the suspects were taken into 
custody by the West Virginia State Police and later charged 
with first-degree murder in the officer's death. The deceased, 
who had 8 years of law enforcement experience, was pronounced 
dead at the scene from fatal wounds to the head and back.
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APPENDIX C
Zero-Order Correlations and Marginal Distributions
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N
51
50
51
51
51
51
51
51
50
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
MARGINAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF DEPENDENT 
AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Standard
Mean Deviation Range Minimum Maximum
26.458 1.303 5.844 23.188 29.032
224.360 14.967 462.000 41.000 503.000
1042.302 649.084 3596.801 186.559 3783.360
111.294 139.072 600.000 0.000 600.000
2.240 3.114 19.436 0.000 19.436
1139.176 1229.295 6146.000 112.000 6258.000
52.274 13.253 80.012 11.163 91.175
101.393 82.668 411.132 0.000 411.132
13942.620 2146.948 12433.000 9999.000 22432.000
78.488 6.481 29.600 60.800 90.400
.144 .087 .322 .022 .344
59.386 25.261 99.900 0.000 99.900
2.594 .779 5.200 1.700 6.900
4275.784 4531.884 21891.000 403.000 22294.000
14.559 7.456 35.500 5.500 41.000
5.018 1.778 10.100 2.500 12.600
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